The Pirates of Somalia_ Inside Their Hidden World - Jay Bahadur [111]
It was a positive sign from the Puntland government, an indication that President Farole was willing to get tough with his own sub-clan in order to earn the trust of the international community. Such commitment from the Farole administration—free of the nepotistic proclivities bred by Somali clanism—will be critical if Puntland is to become a valid partner in the anti-piracy struggle.
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Five years ago, the Somali pirates were little more than fishermen who had traded in their nets for assault rifles and rocket-propelled grenades. Since then, they have blossomed into maritime trade professionals, with an expanding capital base and a logistical and navigational sophistication that has allowed them to strike deep in the Indian Ocean, hundreds of kilometres beyond the reach of the international naval forces.
Though the naval presence continues to burgeon, pirate hijackings are on the rise, and as of February 2011 more vessels are being held hostage along the Somali coast than ever before. The international naval forces have yet to grasp that violence is best used as a scalpel, not a club, and that their efforts to bludgeon the Somali pirates out of existence through sheer military force alone are no more likely to succeed in the future than in the past.
How might Somali piracy look in another five years?
First, the business will probably be a lot more lucrative. The current trend of ransom inflation is almost certain to continue unabated; hijacked vessels and their cargos are often worth hundreds of millions of dollars (over and above the value of the crews’ lives), and pirate negotiators have only just begun to realize how much shipowners are willing to pay. Each time a company agrees to a record-setting ransom, it sets a precedent that fuels the upward pressure on future payments.
Second, pirate gangs are likely to be much more organized. As the payoffs continue to rise, rival organizations, clan militias, and even Somali Islamist groups will be increasingly tempted to rip off successful pirate groups. This threat, in turn, may provoke the pirates to coalesce into more permanent criminal syndicates and establish standing armies of their own. Piracy might well develop into a mafia-style business, complete with infighting, turf wars, and mob hits.
Third, encounters at sea are likely to get a whole lot bloodier. Already, the use of firearms on all sides is on the rise; private security is becoming increasingly common on commercial vessels, the French government has stationed marines on the decks of its Indian Ocean fishing fleet, and Spain has followed suit by subsidizing the cost of armed guards on its own tuna boats. And the pirates are responding; whereas in the past, pirate attack groups used their weapons primarily as noisemakers—with the aim of frightening ships’ crews into surrendering—it has recently become standard practice to fire directly at the attacked vessel and her crew.
The brutality has already begun to escalate. In February 2011 the Associated Press reported that the pirates had begun “systematically torturing” hostages, subjecting them to beatings, locking them in freezers, and ligating their genitals with plastic ties.2 On February 18, there occurred a tragedy unprecedented in the brief history of Somali piracy. In circumstances not yet entirely clear, American retirees Sean and Jean Adam, along with crewmates Phyllis Macay and Bob Riggle, were murdered by pirates after their yacht, the S/V Quest, had been hijacked four hundred kilometres off the coast of Oman. Shadowed by four US warships, navy helicopters whirring overhead, the pirates reportedly panicked and began to fight amongst themselves over which course of action to take. Responding to the sounds of gunfire aboard