The Pirates of Somalia_ Inside Their Hidden World - Jay Bahadur [118]
There is no evidence to suggest that the Victoria hijackers possessed any of these accoutrements. The Victoria was carrying a cargo of rice, and was not the kind of glamorous prize about which a pirate would brag to his friends at the local khat suq. (Romanian media sources went so far as to report that the pirates may have mistaken the Victoria for an oil transport.2) Regardless, Computer’s group would probably not have targeted the Victoria if they had been able to read transponders or had detailed intelligence on vessel itineraries. Indeed, given the pirates’ utter lack of understanding of the Victoria’s radar display (as humorously recounted by Mihai), their attack craft almost certainly did not possess a marine radar system.
The more likely scenario is that the Victoria found them. With limited range and navigational technologies, the pirates were content to float in the IRTC and await a target of opportunity, like patient fishermen waiting for a nibble. In some respects, Levenescu may have been correct when he scornfully claimed that the IRTC had made the pirates’ job easier: though they faced a higher risk of death or capture, the transit corridor saved them the trouble of deciding where to hunt.
Another hypothetical indicator of a sophisticated pirate gang is the practice of gathering intelligence (cargo, itineraries, insurance details) on potential targets, either through “spotters”—informants located in major ports—or through membership in an online maritime tracking service, such as Lloyd’s Marine Intelligence Unit. For the same rationale as discussed above, there is little reason to think the Victoria hijackers made use of either of these resources.
In all probability, their most sophisticated technology was their own eyes, which would have proved quite capable of detecting the Victoria—and her telltale deck cranes—at a distance of ten kilometres.
6. ROLE OF THE DIASPORA
There has been much discussion in the media regarding the supposed transnational criminal networks controlling Somali pirate gangs from behind the scenes. As with many such myths, the drive for a good story often overwhelms the facts.
Though the existence of a transnational criminal conspiracy is highly overstated, the true level of the Somali diaspora’s involvement in piracy is less certain, and Hansen’s research does not help resolve the ambiguity. One of his pirate interviewees claimed that Somali expats from Kenya, Ethiopia, and the Gulf states sometimes provide technology such as goggles and telecommunications systems, as well as their translation services, but only rarely contribute money.
Like the clan networks within the country, the Somali diaspora is extremely integrated and close-knit, with Somali expats constantly moving in and out of Somalia even as they carry on normal lives in their adoptive homelands. The support provided by the diaspora—remittances, access to markets, business connections, and professional advice—is absolutely essential to making life inside Somalia liveable. “Pirate entrepreneurs” will seek to access these resources in the same way as legitimate local businessmen, but this is no more transnational crime than the foreign brother of a US citizen helping him to cheat on his income taxes.
The only known affiliation the Victoria gang had to the diaspora was through Loyan, their interpreter (Mihai told us that Loyan had studied in India for at least five years, which meant he must have held foreign citizenship, as it is virtually impossible to travel on a Somali passport). Men such as Loyan—English-speaking opportunists taking extended vacations in their homeland—are the real face of the so-called transnational