The Polity of the Athenians and the Lacedaemonians [3]
Char." xxv. 3. For those of the gymnasiarchy, see "Dict. of Antiq." "Gymnasium." For that of the trierarchy, see Jebb, op. cit. xxv. 9; xxix. 16; Boeckh, "P. E. A." IV. xi.
[30] See "Econ." ii. 6; Thuc. vi. 31.
[31] See Boeckh, "P. E. A." II. xvi. p. 241.
[32] For the system of judicature, the {dikasteria}, and the boards of jurymen or judges, see Aristot. "Constitution of Athens," ch. lxiii.; "Dict. of Antiq." s.v.
To speak next of the allies, and in reference to the point that emissaries[33] from Athens come out, and, according to common opinion, calumniate and vent their hatred[34] upon the better sort of people, this is done[35] on the principle that the ruler cannot help being hated by those whom he rules; but that if wealth and respectability are to wield power in the subject cities the empire of the Athenian People has but a short lease of existence. This explains why the better people are punished with infamy,[36] robbed of their money, driven from their homes, and put to death, while the baser sort are promoted to honour. On the other hand, the better Athenians throw their aegis over the better class in the allied cities.[37] And why? Because they recognise that it is to the interest of their own class at all times to protect the best element in the cities. It may be urged[38] that if it comes to strength and power the real strength of Athens lies in the capacity of her allies to contribute their money quota. But to the democratic mind[39] it appears a higher advantage still for the individual Athenian to get hold of the wealth of the allies, leaving them only enough to live upon and to cultivate their estates, but powerless to harbour treacherous designs.
[33] For {oi ekpleontes}, see Grote, "H. G." vi. p. 41.
[34] Reading {misousi}; or, if with Kirchhoff, {meiousi}, "in every way humiliate."
[35] Or, "[they do so] as recognising the fact."
[36] {atimia} = the loss of civil rights, either total or partial. See C. R. Kennedy, "Select Speeches of Demosthenes," Note 13, Disenfranchisement.
[37] See Thuc. viii. 48.
[38] See Grote, "H. G." vi. 53.
[39] Or, "to a thorough democrat."
Again,[40] it is looked upon as a mistaken policy on the part of the Athenian democracy to compel her allies to voyage to Athens in order to have their cases tried.[41] On the other hand, it is easy to reckon up what a number of advantages the Athenian People derive from the practice impugned. In the first place, there is the steady receipt of salaries throughout the year[42] derived from the court fees.[43] Next, it enables them to manage the affairs of the allied states while seated at home without the expense of naval expeditions. Thirdly, they thus preserve the partisans of the democracy, and ruin her opponents in the law courts. Whereas, supposing the several allied states tried their cases at home, being inspired by hostility to Athens, they would destroy those of their own citizens whose friendship to the Athenian People was most marked. But besides all this the democracy derives the following advantages from hearing the cases of her allies in Athens. In the first place, the one per cent[44] levied in Piraeus is increased to the profit of the state; again, the owner of a lodging- house[45] does better, and so, too, the owner of a pair of beasts, or of slaves to be let out on hire;[46] again, heralds and criers[47] are a class of people who fare better owing to the sojourn of foreigners at Athens. Further still, supposing the allies had not to resort to Athens for the hearing of cases, only the official representative of the imperial state would be held in honour, such as the general, or trierarch, or ambassador. Whereas now every single individual among the allies is forced to pay flattery to the People of Athens because he knows that he must betake himself to Athens and win or lose[48] his case at the bar, not of any stray set of judges, but of the sovereign People itself, such being the law and custom at Athens. He is compelled to behave as a suppliant[49] in the
[30] See "Econ." ii. 6; Thuc. vi. 31.
[31] See Boeckh, "P. E. A." II. xvi. p. 241.
[32] For the system of judicature, the {dikasteria}, and the boards of jurymen or judges, see Aristot. "Constitution of Athens," ch. lxiii.; "Dict. of Antiq." s.v.
To speak next of the allies, and in reference to the point that emissaries[33] from Athens come out, and, according to common opinion, calumniate and vent their hatred[34] upon the better sort of people, this is done[35] on the principle that the ruler cannot help being hated by those whom he rules; but that if wealth and respectability are to wield power in the subject cities the empire of the Athenian People has but a short lease of existence. This explains why the better people are punished with infamy,[36] robbed of their money, driven from their homes, and put to death, while the baser sort are promoted to honour. On the other hand, the better Athenians throw their aegis over the better class in the allied cities.[37] And why? Because they recognise that it is to the interest of their own class at all times to protect the best element in the cities. It may be urged[38] that if it comes to strength and power the real strength of Athens lies in the capacity of her allies to contribute their money quota. But to the democratic mind[39] it appears a higher advantage still for the individual Athenian to get hold of the wealth of the allies, leaving them only enough to live upon and to cultivate their estates, but powerless to harbour treacherous designs.
[33] For {oi ekpleontes}, see Grote, "H. G." vi. p. 41.
[34] Reading {misousi}; or, if with Kirchhoff, {meiousi}, "in every way humiliate."
[35] Or, "[they do so] as recognising the fact."
[36] {atimia} = the loss of civil rights, either total or partial. See C. R. Kennedy, "Select Speeches of Demosthenes," Note 13, Disenfranchisement.
[37] See Thuc. viii. 48.
[38] See Grote, "H. G." vi. 53.
[39] Or, "to a thorough democrat."
Again,[40] it is looked upon as a mistaken policy on the part of the Athenian democracy to compel her allies to voyage to Athens in order to have their cases tried.[41] On the other hand, it is easy to reckon up what a number of advantages the Athenian People derive from the practice impugned. In the first place, there is the steady receipt of salaries throughout the year[42] derived from the court fees.[43] Next, it enables them to manage the affairs of the allied states while seated at home without the expense of naval expeditions. Thirdly, they thus preserve the partisans of the democracy, and ruin her opponents in the law courts. Whereas, supposing the several allied states tried their cases at home, being inspired by hostility to Athens, they would destroy those of their own citizens whose friendship to the Athenian People was most marked. But besides all this the democracy derives the following advantages from hearing the cases of her allies in Athens. In the first place, the one per cent[44] levied in Piraeus is increased to the profit of the state; again, the owner of a lodging- house[45] does better, and so, too, the owner of a pair of beasts, or of slaves to be let out on hire;[46] again, heralds and criers[47] are a class of people who fare better owing to the sojourn of foreigners at Athens. Further still, supposing the allies had not to resort to Athens for the hearing of cases, only the official representative of the imperial state would be held in honour, such as the general, or trierarch, or ambassador. Whereas now every single individual among the allies is forced to pay flattery to the People of Athens because he knows that he must betake himself to Athens and win or lose[48] his case at the bar, not of any stray set of judges, but of the sovereign People itself, such being the law and custom at Athens. He is compelled to behave as a suppliant[49] in the