The Post-American World - Fareed Zakaria [114]
The more significant ongoing example of this tension has to do with nuclear proliferation. The United States asks the rest of the world to strictly adhere to the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty. The treaty has created a two-tier system: those nations that developed nuclear weapons before 1968 are permitted to have them; those that didn’t are not (and must accordingly follow certain guidelines for developing nuclear energy). But even while insisting that nonnuclear powers comply, the United States and other nuclear powers have been slow to follow the other injunction in the treaty: to “pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race . . . and to nuclear disarmament.” The latest START treaty with Russia is a move in the right direction, but even if fully implemented will leave each side with 1,550 deployed nuclear weapons and thousands more deactivated ones. Thus, when the United States tells countries that to build a single nuclear weapon is a moral, political, and strategic abomination while maintaining such an enormous arsenal, the condemnation rings hollow. Motivated by such concerns, Henry Kissinger, George Shultz, William Perry, and Sam Nunn have proposed that the United States lead an ambitious effort among the nuclear powers to eventually work toward a nonnuclear world. Whether or not we get all the way there—and whether or not a world without nuclear deterrence is a good idea—the United States would gain much credibility if it continued making serious efforts in this direction. Or else, once again it appears to be saying to the rest of the world, “Do what I say, not what I do.”
3. Be Bismarck not Britain. Josef Joffe has argued that there are two historical analogies that the United States can look to in constructing its grand strategy: Britain and Bismarck.12 Britain tried to balance against rising and threatening great powers but otherwise kept a low profile on the European continent. Bismarck, by contrast, chose to engage with all the great powers. His goal was to have better relations with all of them than any of them had with each other—to be the pivot of Europe’s international system.
For the United States, the British option is not the right one. America has played that role in the past—against Nazi Germany and Soviet Russia—but the circumstances today make such a strategy unwise. The world is not divided into camps, and it is far more connected and interdependent than it was. “Balancing” against a rising power would be a dangerous, destabilizing, and potentially self-fulfilling policy. Were Washington to balance against China, before Beijing had shown any serious inclination to disrupt the international order, it would find itself isolated—and would pay heavy costs economically and politically for itself being the disruptive force. Given America’s massive power, not overplaying its hand must be a crucial component of any grand strategy. Otherwise, others will try—in various ways—to balance against it.
Washington is, however, ideally suited to play a Bismarckian role in the current global system. It has better relations with almost all the major powers than they do with each other. In Asia, the Bush administration did an excellent job of strengthening ties with Japan, Australia, and India. The Obama administration is trying to do the same with Russia and China. While Washington has many differences with Moscow and Beijing, there is no advantage to turning them into permanent adversaries.