• Choose a category
• All
• Classic-Fiction

By Root 1270 0

teams would be a bit duller than AFRICOM—but it might be more effective in the long run. This would be true outside Africa as well. What the United States is lacking in a place like Pakistan is a broader effort to assist that country in its modernization and an effort that makes it clear that the United States wants to ally with the people of that country and not merely its military. When I was growing up in India, the U.S. Information Services used to serve as ambassadors of American culture, ideas, and ideals. That entire approach to diplomacy was shuttered after the Cold War and even after 9/11 remains moribund. The U.S. military effort against Islamic extremism has received over $1 trillion in funding. The generous accounting of the figure for diplomatic and civilian activities would be under $10 billion.

America is also much more than its government. And here there is more promising activity. Foundations, universities, charities, and private individuals are working more deeply and effectively abroad. Washington should learn more from these groups, work more with them, and engage other Americans to get involved. American Muslims, instead of being questioned, harassed, and detained, should be enlisted in the effort to understand the appeal of Islamic fundamentalism. One of America’s core strengths—its civil society—has been largely untapped in the war on terror.

6. Legitimacy is power. The United States has every kind of power in ample supply these days except one: legitimacy. In today’s world, this is a critical deficiency. Legitimacy allows one to set the agenda, define a crisis, and mobilize support for policies among both countries and nongovernmental forces like private business and grass-roots organizations. Legitimacy was what allowed the rock singer Bono, for example, to change government policy on a crucial issue, debt relief. His power lay in his ability to capture the intellectual and moral high ground.

Legitimacy comes in many forms. The Clinton administration used force on three important occasions—in Bosnia, Haiti, and Kosovo. In none of them did it take the matter to the UN Security Council, but there was little suggestion that it needed to do so. Indeed, Secretary General Kofi Annan even made statements that seemed to justify the action in Kosovo, explaining that state sovereignty should not be used as a cover for humanitarian abuses. The Clinton administration was able to get away with this partly because of a basic sense of trust. While the Clinton administration—or the George H. W. Bush administration—was assertive in many ways, the rest of the world did not need assurances about its intentions. Because of 9/11, the Bush administration had no choice but to assert American power and act forcefully on the world stage. But that should have given it all the more reason to adopt a posture of consultation and cooperation while doing what needed to be done. It’s one thing to scare your enemies; it’s another to terrify the rest of the world.

The United States retains considerable ability to set the agenda and thereby confer legitimacy with regard to what constitutes a problem, crisis, or outrage. American ideas and ideals still dominate the debates over Darfur, Iranian nuclear weapons, and Burma. But Washington needs to understand that generating international public support for its view of the world is a core element of power, not merely an exercise in public relations. Other countries, peoples, and groups now have access to their own narratives and networks. They will not quietly accept the version of events handed down to them. Washington will have to make its case, and persuasively. This task has gotten more difficult, but it has also become more vital. In an increasingly empowered and democratized world, in the long run, the battle of ideas is close to everything.

The Bush administration never seemed to understand the practical value of legitimacy in the run-up to the Iraq War. American officials would contest the view that they were isolated by pointing to their allies in “new Europe,” Asia, and