The Post-American World - Fareed Zakaria [50]
In places like Taiwan and South Korea in the 1970s and 1980s, economic growth was accompanied by gradual legal, social, and political reforms. Those regimes were authoritarian, not totalitarian—an important distinction—and thus did not seek all-encompassing control over society, which made loosening the grip easier. They were also pushed to open up their systems by the United States, their greatest benefactor. Beijing faces no such pressures. As China changes, the totalitarian structure has cracked, or become irrelevant, in places. People have many more choices and freedoms than before. They can work, move, own property, start businesses, and, to a limited extent, worship whomever they want. But political control remains tight and shows little signs of easing in certain core areas. For example, Beijing has developed an elaborate system to monitor use of the Internet that has been surprisingly effective. It restricts or completely blocks any site that carries information it cannot control, including Google and the West’s most popular social media tools, Facebook and Twitter. When a teacher uploaded photos of poorly built schools that collapsed in the 2008 Sichuan earthquake, he was sent to a labor camp for a year.
The Communist Party spends an enormous amount of time and energy worrying about social stability and popular unrest. This is surely a sign that it faces a problem of uncertain dimensions and with no clear solution. Compare that with China’s democratic neighbor to the south. India’s politicians worry about many things—mostly losing elections—but rarely about social revolution or the survival of the regime itself. They don’t panic at the thought of protests or strikes, instead viewing them as part of the normal back-and-forth between ruler and ruled. Governments that are confident about their systemic legitimacy don’t get paranoid about an organization like the Falun Gong, whose members gather together for breathing exercises.
Many American writers have rushed to claim that China disproves the notion that economic reforms lead to political reform—that capitalism leads to democracy. China might yet prove to be an exception, but it is too soon to tell. The rule has held everywhere from Spain and Greece to South Korea, Taiwan, and Mexico: countries that marketize and modernize begin changing politically around the time that they achieve middle-income status (a rough categorization, that lies somewhere between $5,000 and $10,000).* Since China’s income level is still below that range, it cannot be argued that the country has defied this trend. And as Chinese standards of living rise, political reform is becoming an increasingly urgent issue. The regime will almost certainly face significant challenges over the next fifteen years, even if this does not mean that China will turn into a Western-style liberal democracy overnight. It is more likely to evolve first into a “mixed” regime, much like many Western countries in the nineteenth century or East Asian countries in the 1970s and 1980s, which combined popular participation with some elements of hierarchy and elite control. Keep in mind