The Post-American World - Fareed Zakaria [58]
What could be wrong with building such ties? Nothing—except that as China moves into Africa, it is taking up economic, political, and military space that was occupied by Britain or France or the United States. This will necessarily mean friction as each great power struggles to promote its own interests and its own conception of doing the right thing in Africa. China’s interpretation of its actions is that it doesn’t interfere in these countries’ domestic affairs—that it is, in a sense, value neutral. But is it? Moisés Naím, the former editor of Foreign Policy magazine, tells a story about the Nigerian government negotiating a $5 million loan for train systems with the World Bank in 2007. The bank had insisted that the government clean up the notoriously corrupt railway bureaucracy before it approved the loan. The deal was almost done when the Chinese government stepped in and offered the government a $9 billion loan to rebuild the entire train system—with no strings, no requirements, no need for any reform. The World Bank was sent home within days. Needless to say, much of that Chinese money will go into the bank accounts of key government officials rather than toward better train service for Nigerians.
Beijing has found it useful to deal directly with governments, because they almost always maintain ownership of the resources that China needs. Transactions are simpler when dealing with one centralized authority, particularly if it is an outcast and has nowhere to turn but to China. So China buys platinum and iron ore from Zimbabwe and in turn sells Robert Mugabe weapons and radio-jamming devices—despite a U.S. and European Union ban—which he uses to intimidate, arrest, and kill domestic opposition. Beijing is Mugabe’s most important supporter on the UN Security Council.
In Sudan, China’s involvement runs even deeper. It has invested billions in the oil fields there since 1999. Chinese companies are the majority shareholders in the two largest oil conglomerates in the country, and China buys 65 percent of Sudan’s oil exports. It maintains a military alliance with Sudan and, despite UN restrictions, appears to have provided arms that end up in the hands of progovernment militias in Darfur. Chinese officials often confirm that they have a close military relationship with Sudan and intend to keep it that way. Explaining his country’s position, China’s deputy foreign minister was frank: “Business is business. We try to separate politics from business. Secondly, I think the internal situation in Sudan is an internal affair, and we are not in a position to impose upon them.”
If China were a bit player on the global stage, it wouldn’t matter much what it was doing in Zimbabwe or Sudan. Cuba, for all we know, has extensive dealings with both governments, but no one cares. Beijing, on the other hand, cannot hide its light under the bushel anymore. China’s dealings with these countries give them a lifeline, retard progress, and, in the long run, perpetuate the cycle of bad regimes and social tensions that plagues the African continent. This kind of relationship also ensures that while Africa’s governments might view China favorably, its people will have more mixed views—as they have had of Western governments through the years.
Beijing has been slow to recognize its broader responsibility in this region, arguing that it is simply minding its own business. But in fact, it isn’t even doing that. Beijing has often shown itself to be well aware of its power. One reason it has focused on Africa is that the continent has long included a number of countries that have been friendly with Taiwan. Although four of the twenty-three governments in the world that have relations with Taiwan today are in Africa, eight countries—including South Africa—have switched recognition from Taipei to Beijing over the last decade and a half thanks to judicious offers of aid.
China has been more skillful and used better diplomacy and soft power in Asia, the region where Beijing devotes the most time,