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By Root 1178 0

even in Mumbai. The Hindu-Muslim divide might be crucially important in one set of states, but it is absent in others. Political leaders who are strong in Tamil Nadu have no following whatsoever in the north. Punjab has its own distinct political culture that relates to Sikh issues and the history of Hindu-Sikh relations. Politicians from Rajasthan have no appeal in Karnataka. They cannot speak each other’s language—literally. It would be like holding elections across Europe and trying to talk about the same issues with voters in Poland, Greece, France, and Ireland. Winston Churchill once said that India was “just a geographic term, with no more political personality than Europe.” Churchill was usually wrong about India, but on this issue, he had a point.

This diversity and division has many advantages. It adds to India’s variety and societal energy, and it prevents the country from succumbing to dictatorship. When Indira Gandhi tried to run the government in an authoritarian and centralized manner in the 1970s, it simply didn’t work, provoking violent revolts in six of its regions. Over the last two decades, Indian regionalism has flourished, and the country has found its natural order. Even hypernationalism becomes difficult in a diverse land. When the BJP tries to unleash Hindu chauvinism as a political weapon against India’s Muslim minority, it often finds that lower-caste Hindus, as well as south Indians, are alienated and rattled by the rhetoric, which sounds exclusionary and upper-caste to them.

But this diversity and division also complicate the work of the Indian state. The constraints of the past decade are not transient phenomena that will fade; they are expressions of a structural reality in Indian politics. They make it difficult for New Delhi to define a national interest, mobilize the country behind it, and then execute a set of policies to achieve its goals, whether in economic reform or foreign policy. The prime minister cannot command national power the way that Nehru did, and in all probability no prime minister will ever do so again. The office has gone from commander in chief to chairman of the board, and the ruling party has become first among equals in a coalition. The central government often gives in to the prerogatives and power of the regional governments, which are increasingly assertive and independent. In economic terms, this means a future of muddling along, minor reforms, and energy and experimentation at the state level. In foreign policy, it means no large shifts in approach, few major commitments, and a less active and energetic role on the world stage. India will have a larger role in international affairs than ever before. It will dominate South Asia. But it may not become the global power that some hope for and others fear. At least not for a while.

If there ever was a race between India and China, it’s over. China’s economy is nearly four times the size of India’s and is still growing at a faster clip. The law of compounding tells us that India can overtake China economically only if there are drastic and sustained shifts in both countries’ trajectories that last for decades. The more likely scenario is that China will stay well ahead of India. But India can still capitalize on its advantages—a vast, growing economy, an attractive political democracy, a vibrant model of secularism and tolerance, a keen knowledge of both East and West, and a special relationship with America. If it can mobilize these forces and use them to its advantage, India will still make for a powerful package, whether it is technically number two, or three, or four in the world.

One experience relevant to India today is that of the United States of America in the late nineteenth century. Domestic constraints substantially slowed America’s political rise to world power. By 1890, America had overtaken Britain as the world’s leading economy, but in diplomatic and military terms, it was a second-rung power. Its army ranked fourteenth in the world, after Bulgaria’s. Its navy was one-eighth the size of Italy’s, even