The Scottish Philosophy [130]
comprehends all that is in the genus, and those attributes, likewise, which distinguish that species from others belonging to the same genus, and, the more subdivisions we make, the names of the lower become still the more comprehensive in their signification, {217} but the less extensive in their application to individuals." (P. 391.) In regard to the subjects discussed by the nominalists, realists, and conceptualists, he is a moderate conceptualist, dwelling fondly on the necessity of observing the points of resemblance in the objects placed in the group. He has some good remarks on the formation of general notions, but does not discover -- what is, after all, the essential point-the putting together in the class all the objects possessing the common attribute, or attributes, fixed on. His realistic tendency is seen in the remark: "When I speak of general notions, or general conceptions, I always mean things conceived, and not the act of the mind in conceiving them." (P. 404.)
. Under this head we are introduced to the full discussion of his favorite subject, common sense, which he says means common judgment. " We ascribe to reason two offices, or two degrees. The first is to judge of things self-evident the second, to draw conclusions which are not self-evident from those that are. The first of these is the province and the sole province of common sense; and therefore it coincides with reason in its whole extent, and is only another name for one branch or degree of reason." (P. 425.) He divides the principles of common sense into two classes: -- as they are contingent; or as they are necessary and immutable, whose contrary is impossible.
I. P/RINCIPLES OF\ C/OMMON\ S/ENSE RELATING TO\ C/ONTINGENT\ T/RUTH\. 1. The existence of every thing of which I am conscious. 2. The thoughts of which I am conscious are the thoughts of a being which I call myself, my mind, my person. 3 Those things did really happen which I distinctly remember. 4. Our own personal identity and continued existence as far back as we remember distinctly. 5. Those things do really exist which we distinctly perceive by our senses, and are what we perceive them to be. 6. We have some degree of power over our actions, and the determinations of our wills. 7. The natural faculties by which we distinguish truth from error are not fallacious.{218} 8. There is life and intelligence in our fellow-men with whom we converse. 9. That certain features of the countenance, sounds of the voice, and gestures of the body, indicate certain thoughts and dispositions of the mind. 10. There is a certain regard due to human testimony in matters of fact, and even to human authority in matters of opinion. 11. There are many events depending on the will of man in which there is a self-evident probability, greater or less according to circumstances. 12. In the phenomena of nature, what is to be will probably be like to what has been in similar circumstances.
II. P/RINCIPLES RELATING TO\ N/ECESSARY\ T/RUTHS\. 1. Grammatical; as, that every adjective in a sentence must belong to some substantive expressed or understood. 2. Logical axioms; such as, any contexture of words which does not make a proposition is neither true nor false. 3. Mathematical axioms. 4. Axioms in matters of taste. 5. First Principles in Morals; as, that an unjust action has more demerit than an ungenerous one. 6. Metaphysical; as that, a. The qualities which we perceive by our senses must have a subject, which we all body; and that the thoughts we are conscious of must have a subject, which we call mind. b. Whatever begins to exist must have a cause which produced it. c. Design and intelligence in the cause may be inferred with certainty from marks or signs of it in the effect.
The first remark I have
I. P/RINCIPLES OF\ C/OMMON\ S/ENSE RELATING TO\ C/ONTINGENT\ T/RUTH\. 1. The existence of every thing of which I am conscious. 2. The thoughts of which I am conscious are the thoughts of a being which I call myself, my mind, my person. 3 Those things did really happen which I distinctly remember. 4. Our own personal identity and continued existence as far back as we remember distinctly. 5. Those things do really exist which we distinctly perceive by our senses, and are what we perceive them to be. 6. We have some degree of power over our actions, and the determinations of our wills. 7. The natural faculties by which we distinguish truth from error are not fallacious.{218} 8. There is life and intelligence in our fellow-men with whom we converse. 9. That certain features of the countenance, sounds of the voice, and gestures of the body, indicate certain thoughts and dispositions of the mind. 10. There is a certain regard due to human testimony in matters of fact, and even to human authority in matters of opinion. 11. There are many events depending on the will of man in which there is a self-evident probability, greater or less according to circumstances. 12. In the phenomena of nature, what is to be will probably be like to what has been in similar circumstances.
II. P/RINCIPLES RELATING TO\ N/ECESSARY\ T/RUTHS\. 1. Grammatical; as, that every adjective in a sentence must belong to some substantive expressed or understood. 2. Logical axioms; such as, any contexture of words which does not make a proposition is neither true nor false. 3. Mathematical axioms. 4. Axioms in matters of taste. 5. First Principles in Morals; as, that an unjust action has more demerit than an ungenerous one. 6. Metaphysical; as that, a. The qualities which we perceive by our senses must have a subject, which we all body; and that the thoughts we are conscious of must have a subject, which we call mind. b. Whatever begins to exist must have a cause which produced it. c. Design and intelligence in the cause may be inferred with certainty from marks or signs of it in the effect.
The first remark I have