The Scottish Philosophy [144]
were published. But in this work we have to look merely at the philosophical discussions in his work on the " Philosophy of Rhetoric," which was commenced at Banchory, and published in 1776.
We have seen all throughout this history that the Scottish metaphysicians following Shaftesbury were fond of speculating about beauty and taste, and that all the Scottish thinkers at this time were anxious to acquire an elegant style. Adam Smith for several years read lectures with great eclat on rhetoric and belles-lettres in Edinburgh, under the patronage of Lord Kames, and afterwards did the same in the class of logic in Glasgow University. Lord Kames himself discussed like subjects in his " Elements of Criticism." The elegant preacher Dr. Hugh Blair lectured on the subject in the university of Edinburgh, and his " Lectures on Rhetoric and Belles-lettres " is one of the most useful books ever published on the art of composition. These works were used for several ages, not only in Scotland, but even in England, and helped to make rhetoric a leading branch of study in all the American colleges. Among all the works, Campbell's " Philosophy of Rhetoric " is perhaps the most philosophical, or is, at least, the one in which there is the most frequent discussion of philosophic problems.[70]
He opens: " In speaking, there is always some end in view, or some effect which the speaker intends to produce on the hearer." The word, in its greatest latitude, denotes that art or talent by which the discourse is adapted to its end. In speaking of oratory suited to light and trivial matters, he endeavors to define wit. "It is the design of wit to excite in {242} the mind an agreeable surprise, and that arising not from any thing marvellous in the subject, but solely from the imagery she employs, or the strange assemblage of related ideas presented to the mind." This end is effected in one or other of these three was, -- first, in debasing things pompous or seemingly grave;" "secondly, in agarandizing things, little and frivolous; thirdly, in setting ordinary objects by means not only remote, but apparently contrary, in a particular and uncommon point of view."
He enlarges, as most of the Scottish metaphysicians have done, on the different kinds of evidence. He begins with intuitive evidence, which, he says, is of different sorts. " One is that which results purely from intellection. Of this kind is the evidence of these propositions: 'One and four make five;' things equal to the same thing are equal to one another; `the whole is greater than a part;' and, in brief, all in arithmetic and geometry. These are in effect but so many different expositions of our own general notions taken in different views." " But when the thing, though in effect coinciding, is considered under a different aspect, - - when what is single in the subject's divided in the predicate, and conversely, or when what is a whole in the one is regarded as a part of something in the other, -- such propositions lead to the discovery of innumerable and apparently remote relations." Under this head be also places, secondly, consciousness, "whence every man derives the perfect assurance which he hath of his own existence." He mentions, thirdly, common sense, giving to Buffier the credit of first noticing this principle as one of the genuine springs of our knowledge, whereas Shaftesbury had previously given it a special and important place. That he has not a definite idea of what common sense is as a philosophic principle, is evident from his stating that "in different persons it prevails in different degrees of strength," thus confounding the common principles of intelligence in all men with the sound sense possessed only by certain persons. He mentions a number of such principles, such as "whatever has a beginning has a cause;" "when there is in the effect a manifest adjustment of the several parts to a certain end, there is intelligence," "the course of nature will be the same tomorrow that it is to-day." He tries to draw distinctions between different
We have seen all throughout this history that the Scottish metaphysicians following Shaftesbury were fond of speculating about beauty and taste, and that all the Scottish thinkers at this time were anxious to acquire an elegant style. Adam Smith for several years read lectures with great eclat on rhetoric and belles-lettres in Edinburgh, under the patronage of Lord Kames, and afterwards did the same in the class of logic in Glasgow University. Lord Kames himself discussed like subjects in his " Elements of Criticism." The elegant preacher Dr. Hugh Blair lectured on the subject in the university of Edinburgh, and his " Lectures on Rhetoric and Belles-lettres " is one of the most useful books ever published on the art of composition. These works were used for several ages, not only in Scotland, but even in England, and helped to make rhetoric a leading branch of study in all the American colleges. Among all the works, Campbell's " Philosophy of Rhetoric " is perhaps the most philosophical, or is, at least, the one in which there is the most frequent discussion of philosophic problems.[70]
He opens: " In speaking, there is always some end in view, or some effect which the speaker intends to produce on the hearer." The word
He enlarges, as most of the Scottish metaphysicians have done, on the different kinds of evidence. He begins with intuitive evidence, which, he says, is of different sorts. " One is that which results purely from intellection. Of this kind is the evidence of these propositions: 'One and four make five;' things equal to the same thing are equal to one another; `the whole is greater than a part;' and, in brief, all in arithmetic and geometry. These are in effect but so many different expositions of our own general notions taken in different views." " But when the thing, though in effect coinciding, is considered under a different aspect, - - when what is single in the subject's divided in the predicate, and conversely, or when what is a whole in the one is regarded as a part of something in the other, -- such propositions lead to the discovery of innumerable and apparently remote relations." Under this head be also places, secondly, consciousness, "whence every man derives the perfect assurance which he hath of his own existence." He mentions, thirdly, common sense, giving to Buffier the credit of first noticing this principle as one of the genuine springs of our knowledge, whereas Shaftesbury had previously given it a special and important place. That he has not a definite idea of what common sense is as a philosophic principle, is evident from his stating that "in different persons it prevails in different degrees of strength," thus confounding the common principles of intelligence in all men with the sound sense possessed only by certain persons. He mentions a number of such principles, such as "whatever has a beginning has a cause;" "when there is in the effect a manifest adjustment of the several parts to a certain end, there is intelligence," "the course of nature will be the same tomorrow that it is to-day." He tries to draw distinctions between different