The Scottish Philosophy [184]
the complex emotions produced." In entering on his " Analysis," he proceeds on the philosophic principle, that we should consider the effects before we proceed to determine the cause. So he is to begin with considering the effect produced on the mind when the emotions of beauty or sublimity are felt, and then go on to investigate the causes which are productive of it, or, in other words, the sources of the beautiful and sublime in nature.
(1) "When any object either of sublimity or beauty is presented to the mind, I believe man is conscious of a train of thought being immediately awakened in his imagination analogous to the character or expression of the original object. The simple perception of the object, we frequently find, is insufficient to excite these emotions, unless it is accompanied with this operation of mind; unless, according to common expression, {310} our imagination is seized and our fancy busied in the pursuit of all those trains of thought which are allied to this character or expression. Thus, when we feel either the beauty or sublimity of natural scenery, the gay lustre of a morning in spring, or the mild radiance of a summer evening, the savage majesty of a wintry storm, or the wild magnificence of a tempestuous ocean, -- we are conscious of a variety of images in our minds very different from those which the objects themselves can. present to the eye. Trains of pleasing or of solemn thought arise spontaneously within our minds: our hearts swell with emotions of which the objects before us afford no adequate cause." The state of mind most favorable to the emotions of taste is one in which the imagination is free and unembarrassed; and the feeling is not interfered with by any thing which interrupts the flow, is not interfered with in particular by the intrusion of criticism. He shows that the exercise of imagination and the feeling of beauty is increased by association, especially that of resemblance, and enters upon the field which had been so cultivated by Beattie. He remarks very truly how an acquaintance with poetry in our earlier years has a powerful influence in increasing our sensibility to the beauties of nature.
He then gives an analysis of the peculiar exercise of the imagination. There is, in all cases, the indulgence of a train of thought. But then, every train of thought does not raise emotions of beauty; and so he investigates the nature of those trains of thought that are produced by object, of sublimity and beauty, and their difference from those ordinary trains which are unaccompanied with such pleasure. This difference consists in two things: first, in the nature of the ideas or conceptions which compose such trains; and, secondly, in the nature of the law of their succession. Some ideas are fitted to raise emotions: these he calls " ideas of emotions; " and the train of thought which produces beauty is in all cases composed of ideas capable of exciting some affection or emotion." Thus, the ideas suggested by the scenery of spring are ideas productive of emotions of cheerfulness, of gladness, and of tenderness. The images suggested by the prospect of ruins are images belonging to pity, to melancholy, to admiration. The ideas in the same manner awakened by the view of the ocean in a storm are ideas of power, of majesty, and of terror. But farther the {311} ideas themselves must have some general principle of connection, subsisting through the whole extent of the train, giving them a certain and definite character, and a conformity to that peculiar emotion which first excited them. It appears, that " in every operation of taste, there are thus two different faculties employed; viz., some affection or emotion raised, and the imagination excited to a train of thought corresponding to this emotion. The peculiar pleasure which attends and which constitutes the emotions of taste, may naturally be considered as composed of the pleasures which separately attend the exercise of those faculties, or, in other words, as produced by the union of pleasing emotion with the pleasure
(1) "When any object either of sublimity or beauty is presented to the mind, I believe man is conscious of a train of thought being immediately awakened in his imagination analogous to the character or expression of the original object. The simple perception of the object, we frequently find, is insufficient to excite these emotions, unless it is accompanied with this operation of mind; unless, according to common expression, {310} our imagination is seized and our fancy busied in the pursuit of all those trains of thought which are allied to this character or expression. Thus, when we feel either the beauty or sublimity of natural scenery, the gay lustre of a morning in spring, or the mild radiance of a summer evening, the savage majesty of a wintry storm, or the wild magnificence of a tempestuous ocean, -- we are conscious of a variety of images in our minds very different from those which the objects themselves can. present to the eye. Trains of pleasing or of solemn thought arise spontaneously within our minds: our hearts swell with emotions of which the objects before us afford no adequate cause." The state of mind most favorable to the emotions of taste is one in which the imagination is free and unembarrassed; and the feeling is not interfered with by any thing which interrupts the flow, is not interfered with in particular by the intrusion of criticism. He shows that the exercise of imagination and the feeling of beauty is increased by association, especially that of resemblance, and enters upon the field which had been so cultivated by Beattie. He remarks very truly how an acquaintance with poetry in our earlier years has a powerful influence in increasing our sensibility to the beauties of nature.
He then gives an analysis of the peculiar exercise of the imagination. There is, in all cases, the indulgence of a train of thought. But then, every train of thought does not raise emotions of beauty; and so he investigates the nature of those trains of thought that are produced by object, of sublimity and beauty, and their difference from those ordinary trains which are unaccompanied with such pleasure. This difference consists in two things: first, in the nature of the ideas or conceptions which compose such trains; and, secondly, in the nature of the law of their succession. Some ideas are fitted to raise emotions: these he calls " ideas of emotions; " and the train of thought which produces beauty is in all cases composed of ideas capable of exciting some affection or emotion." Thus, the ideas suggested by the scenery of spring are ideas productive of emotions of cheerfulness, of gladness, and of tenderness. The images suggested by the prospect of ruins are images belonging to pity, to melancholy, to admiration. The ideas in the same manner awakened by the view of the ocean in a storm are ideas of power, of majesty, and of terror. But farther the {311} ideas themselves must have some general principle of connection, subsisting through the whole extent of the train, giving them a certain and definite character, and a conformity to that peculiar emotion which first excited them. It appears, that " in every operation of taste, there are thus two different faculties employed; viz., some affection or emotion raised, and the imagination excited to a train of thought corresponding to this emotion. The peculiar pleasure which attends and which constitutes the emotions of taste, may naturally be considered as composed of the pleasures which separately attend the exercise of those faculties, or, in other words, as produced by the union of pleasing emotion with the pleasure