The Scottish Philosophy [194]
-- that of trusting to analyses instead of patient observation; and, like the French school, his analysis is exercised in reducing the phenomena of the mind to as few powers as possible, and this he succeeds in doing by omitting some of the most characteristic peculiarities of the phenomena. His classification of the faculties bears a general resemblance to that of M. de Tracy, the metaphysician of the sensational school. The Frenchman's division of the faculties is -- sensibility, memory, judgment, and desire Brown's is-sensation, simple and relative suggestion, and emotion.
In estimating the influences exercised from without on Brown, we must further take into account, that ever since the days of Hartley there had been a great propensity in Britain to magnify the power and importance of the association of ideas. Not only habit but most of our conceptions and beliefs had been referred to it: Beattie and Alison, followed by Jeffrey, ascribed to it our ideas of beauty; and, in a later age, Sir James Mackintosh carried this tendency the greatest length, and helped to bring about a reaction, by tracing our very idea of virtue to this source. It is evident that Brown felt this influence largely. Our intelligence is resolved by him into simple and relative suggestion. There is a flagrant and inexcusable oversight here. All that association, or, as he designates it, suggestion, can explain, is the order of the succession of our mental states; it can render no account of the character of the states themselves. It might show, for example, in what circumstances a notion of any kind arises, say our notion of time, or space, or extension, but cannot explain the nature of the notion itself.
But it will be necessary to enter a little more minutely into the system of Brown. From the affection which I bear to his memory, and remembering that his views have never been used by himself or others to undermine any of the great principles of morality, I would begin with his excellences. {327}
(1) In specifying these, I am inclined to mention, first, his lofty views of man's spiritual being. He everywhere draws the distinction between mind and body very decidedly. In this respect, he is a true follower of the school of Descartes and Reid, and is vastly superior to some who, while blaming Locke and Brown for holding views tending to sensationalism, or even materialism, do yet assure us that the essential distinction between mind and matter is now broken down.
(2) I have already referred to the circumstance, that Brown stands up resolutely for intuitive principles, and in this respect is a genuine disciple of the Scottish school. He calls them by the very name which some prefer as most expressive, -- " beliefs; " and employs the test which Leibnitz and Kant have been so lauded as introducing into philosophy. He everywhere characterizes them as "irresistible,"-a phrase pointing to the same quality as "necessary,"-the term used by the German metaphysicians. No one, not even Cousin, has demonstrated, in a more effective manner, that our belief in cause and effect is not derived from experience. " When we say, then, that B will follow A to-morrow, because A was followed by B to-day, we do not prove that the future will resemble the past, but we take for granted that the future is to resemble the past. We have only to ask ourselves why we believe in this similarity of sequence; and our very inability of stating any ground of inference may convince us that the belief, which it is impossible for us not to feel (observe the appeal to necessity, but it is an appeal to a necessity of feeling), is the result of some other principle of reasoning." (" Cause and Effect," P. 111.) " In ascribing the belief of efficiency to such a principle, we place it, then, on a foundation as strong as that on which we suppose our belief of an external world, and even of our own identity, to rest. What daring atheist is he, who has ever truly disbelieved the existence of himself and others? For it is he alone who can say, with corresponding argument,
In estimating the influences exercised from without on Brown, we must further take into account, that ever since the days of Hartley there had been a great propensity in Britain to magnify the power and importance of the association of ideas. Not only habit but most of our conceptions and beliefs had been referred to it: Beattie and Alison, followed by Jeffrey, ascribed to it our ideas of beauty; and, in a later age, Sir James Mackintosh carried this tendency the greatest length, and helped to bring about a reaction, by tracing our very idea of virtue to this source. It is evident that Brown felt this influence largely. Our intelligence is resolved by him into simple and relative suggestion. There is a flagrant and inexcusable oversight here. All that association, or, as he designates it, suggestion, can explain, is the order of the succession of our mental states; it can render no account of the character of the states themselves. It might show, for example, in what circumstances a notion of any kind arises, say our notion of time, or space, or extension, but cannot explain the nature of the notion itself.
But it will be necessary to enter a little more minutely into the system of Brown. From the affection which I bear to his memory, and remembering that his views have never been used by himself or others to undermine any of the great principles of morality, I would begin with his excellences. {327}
(1) In specifying these, I am inclined to mention, first, his lofty views of man's spiritual being. He everywhere draws the distinction between mind and body very decidedly. In this respect, he is a true follower of the school of Descartes and Reid, and is vastly superior to some who, while blaming Locke and Brown for holding views tending to sensationalism, or even materialism, do yet assure us that the essential distinction between mind and matter is now broken down.
(2) I have already referred to the circumstance, that Brown stands up resolutely for intuitive principles, and in this respect is a genuine disciple of the Scottish school. He calls them by the very name which some prefer as most expressive, -- " beliefs; " and employs the test which Leibnitz and Kant have been so lauded as introducing into philosophy. He everywhere characterizes them as "irresistible,"-a phrase pointing to the same quality as "necessary,"-the term used by the German metaphysicians. No one, not even Cousin, has demonstrated, in a more effective manner, that our belief in cause and effect is not derived from experience. " When we say, then, that B will follow A to-morrow, because A was followed by B to-day, we do not prove that the future will resemble the past, but we take for granted that the future is to resemble the past. We have only to ask ourselves why we believe in this similarity of sequence; and our very inability of stating any ground of inference may convince us that the belief, which it is impossible for us not to feel (observe the appeal to necessity, but it is an appeal to a necessity of feeling), is the result of some other principle of reasoning." (" Cause and Effect," P. 111.) " In ascribing the belief of efficiency to such a principle, we place it, then, on a foundation as strong as that on which we suppose our belief of an external world, and even of our own identity, to rest. What daring atheist is he, who has ever truly disbelieved the existence of himself and others? For it is he alone who can say, with corresponding argument,