The Scottish Philosophy [211]
These three ends are not kept separate, but run through the whole work. We may first take a cursory view of the historical exposition, and then critically examine his own theory.
He has a retrospect of ancient ethics. His sketches are not equal to those of Adam Smith in his "Theory of Moral Sentiments," but are worthy of being placed near them. They are not very erudite or very profound, but they are by no means superficial. He can sketch admirably the practical tendency of a philosophic system such as that of the Stoics. He has then a retrospect of scholastic ethics. It could scarcely be expected of a whig that he should have much reverence for mediaeval times; but, in his treatment of the schoolmen, he is appreciative in the highest degree of their excellencies. It is evident that he has not that thorough acquaintance with their discussions and individual opinions which later research on the part of historians of philosophy and of the church might have enabled him to attain. He enters on a more congenial theme when he comes to modern times.
He begins with Grotius and Hobbes, of both of whom he has a high admiration, but remarks of Hobbes' system, that " a theory of man which comprehends in its explanations neither the social affections nor the moral sentiments must be owned to be sufficiently defective." He then enters on the controversies concerning the moral faculties and social affections, and gives a critical exposition of Cumberland, Cudworth, Clarke, Shaftesbury, Bossuet, Fenelon, Leibnitz, Malebranche, Edwards, and Buffier. He has formed a higher estimate of the merits of Edwards than most Europeans, whether British or German. He had studied the " Treatise on the Will " when a student in Aberdeen, and he favors the view taken by Edwards that virtue consists in love to being as being, according as being has claims on it. But whence the claims of being? An answer to this question must bring us, whether we wish or no, to an ethical {356} principle guiding the direction and flow of the affection. The discussion by Edwards is certainly a very profound one, and he brings out deep truths of which Mackintosh did not discover the importance.
He goes on to men who are represented as laying the foundations of a more just theory of ethics; that is, as approaching nearer the theory of Mackintosh. He gives just and valuable accounts of the systems of Butler, Hutcheson, Berkeley, Hume, Smith, Price, Hartley, Tucker, Paley, Bentham, Stewart, and Brown. He perhaps, exaggerates the originality of Butler, who was much indebted to Shaftesbury, but passed far beyond him in maintaining the supremacy of conscience. " In these sermons he has taught truths more capable of being exactly distinguished from the doctrines of his predecessors, more satisfactorily established by him, more comprehensively applied to particulars, more rationally connected with each other, and, therefore, more worthy of the name of discovery, than any with which we are acquainted; if we ought not, with some hesitation, to accept the first steps of Grecian philosophy towards a theory of morals." Mackintosh does not seem to be aware that, lofty as was Berkeley's idealism in its moral tone, his ethical system is based on pleasure as the ultimate good. " Sensual pleasure is the. This is the great principle of morality. This once rightly understood, all the doctrines, even the severest of the gospels, may clearly be demonstrated. Sensual pleasures, qua pleasure, is good and desirable by a wise man. But if it be contemptible, 'tis not pleasure, but pain, or (which is the same thing) of loss of greater pleasure." (" Berkeley's Works, by Fraser, vol. iv. 457). He has a great admiration of Hartley, but points out his defects. ,The work of Dr. Hartley entitled `Observations on Man' is distinguished by an uncommon union of originality with modesty in unfolding a simple and fruitful principle of human nature. It is disfigured by the ab surd affectation of mathematical forms then prevalent; and it is encumbered by a mass of
He has a retrospect of ancient ethics. His sketches are not equal to those of Adam Smith in his "Theory of Moral Sentiments," but are worthy of being placed near them. They are not very erudite or very profound, but they are by no means superficial. He can sketch admirably the practical tendency of a philosophic system such as that of the Stoics. He has then a retrospect of scholastic ethics. It could scarcely be expected of a whig that he should have much reverence for mediaeval times; but, in his treatment of the schoolmen, he is appreciative in the highest degree of their excellencies. It is evident that he has not that thorough acquaintance with their discussions and individual opinions which later research on the part of historians of philosophy and of the church might have enabled him to attain. He enters on a more congenial theme when he comes to modern times.
He begins with Grotius and Hobbes, of both of whom he has a high admiration, but remarks of Hobbes' system, that " a theory of man which comprehends in its explanations neither the social affections nor the moral sentiments must be owned to be sufficiently defective." He then enters on the controversies concerning the moral faculties and social affections, and gives a critical exposition of Cumberland, Cudworth, Clarke, Shaftesbury, Bossuet, Fenelon, Leibnitz, Malebranche, Edwards, and Buffier. He has formed a higher estimate of the merits of Edwards than most Europeans, whether British or German. He had studied the " Treatise on the Will " when a student in Aberdeen, and he favors the view taken by Edwards that virtue consists in love to being as being, according as being has claims on it. But whence the claims of being? An answer to this question must bring us, whether we wish or no, to an ethical {356} principle guiding the direction and flow of the affection. The discussion by Edwards is certainly a very profound one, and he brings out deep truths of which Mackintosh did not discover the importance.
He goes on to men who are represented as laying the foundations of a more just theory of ethics; that is, as approaching nearer the theory of Mackintosh. He gives just and valuable accounts of the systems of Butler, Hutcheson, Berkeley, Hume, Smith, Price, Hartley, Tucker, Paley, Bentham, Stewart, and Brown. He perhaps, exaggerates the originality of Butler, who was much indebted to Shaftesbury, but passed far beyond him in maintaining the supremacy of conscience. " In these sermons he has taught truths more capable of being exactly distinguished from the doctrines of his predecessors, more satisfactorily established by him, more comprehensively applied to particulars, more rationally connected with each other, and, therefore, more worthy of the name of discovery, than any with which we are acquainted; if we ought not, with some hesitation, to accept the first steps of Grecian philosophy towards a theory of morals." Mackintosh does not seem to be aware that, lofty as was Berkeley's idealism in its moral tone, his ethical system is based on pleasure as the ultimate good. " Sensual pleasure is the