The Scottish Philosophy [228]
corrections admit principles which these authors have not dared to avow or to carry out, as they involve so many other mental operations beyond sensations and ideas.
In Chap. III. he goes on to his favorite subject, association of ideas. Ideas have a synchronous and a successive order. When sensations have occurred synchronically, the ideas also spring up synchronically," and thus he fashions many of our complex ideas, as of a violin with a certain figure and tone. He resolves the ideas of successive associations into the one {381} law of contiguity. This resolution has been criticised by Hamilton (" Reid's Collected Works " Note D. . . . 2), and also by his son (Note to Chap. III.), who endeavor to show that the suggestion of similars cannot be thus accounted for, which they certainly cannot be unless we call in some intermediate processes. He shows how, by these associations, we get certain complex ideas, as the ideas of metals from the separate ideas of several sensations, -- color, hardness, extension, weight. In illustrating this point, he says, that " philosophy has ascertained that we draw nothing from the eye whatever but sensations of color." In opposition to this, Hamilton has demonstrated that, if we perceive color, we must also perceive the line that separates one color from another (Met. Lect. 27). The result he has reached is summed up: "We have seen first that we have sensations secondly, that we have ideas, the copies of these sensations thirdly, that those ideas are sometimes simple, the copies of one sensation; sometimes complex, the copies of several sensations so combined as to appear not several ideas but one idea and, fourthly, that we have trains of these ideas, or one succeeding another without end."
He turns to naming (Chap. IV.), and treats of the various parts of speech, but throws little light on them. He goes on to explain the various processes of the mind, beginning with consciousness (Chap. V.). " To say I feel a sensation, is merely to say I feel a feeling, which is an impropriety of speech; and to say I am conscious of a feeling is merely to say that I feel it. To have a feeling is to be conscious, and to be conscious is to have a feeling." "In the very word 'feeling' all that is implied in the word 'consciousness' is involved." There is a palpable oversight here. When I feel a sensation it is of a sensitive organ as affected, and knowledge is involved in this. To be conscious is to know self as feeling or in some other state. " When I smell a rose, I am conscious." True, but I am conscious not of the rose, but of self as having the sensation. In explaining consciousness, he overlooks the very peculiarity of the thing to be explained.
He then (Chap. V., VI., VII., VIII., IX.) treats of conception, imagination, classification, abstraction. " Conception applies only to ideas and to ideas only in a state of combination. It is a general name, including the several classes of complex {382} ideas." But the question arises, What intellectual bond combines things generally? and we have no satisfactory answer. He thus misses one of the most important capacities of our mental nature. " An imagination is the name of a train but what combines so many scattered things into one image, often so grand? He has a long disquisition on classification. The word `man,' we shall say, is first applied to an individual it is first associated with the idea of that individual, and acquires the power of calling up the idea of him; it is next applied to another individual, and acquires the power of calling tip the idea of him, so of another and another, till it has become associated with an infinite number, and has acquired the power of calling up an indefinite number of these ideas indifferently." " It is association that forms the ideas of an indefinite number of individuals into one complex idea." Here again he has explained every thing by overlooking the of the process, -- the resemblance between the individuals; the perception of the resemblances; the placing the resembling
In Chap. III. he goes on to his favorite subject, association of ideas. Ideas have a synchronous and a successive order. When sensations have occurred synchronically, the ideas also spring up synchronically," and thus he fashions many of our complex ideas, as of a violin with a certain figure and tone. He resolves the ideas of successive associations into the one {381} law of contiguity. This resolution has been criticised by Hamilton (" Reid's Collected Works " Note D. . . . 2), and also by his son (Note to Chap. III.), who endeavor to show that the suggestion of similars cannot be thus accounted for, which they certainly cannot be unless we call in some intermediate processes. He shows how, by these associations, we get certain complex ideas, as the ideas of metals from the separate ideas of several sensations, -- color, hardness, extension, weight. In illustrating this point, he says, that " philosophy has ascertained that we draw nothing from the eye whatever but sensations of color." In opposition to this, Hamilton has demonstrated that, if we perceive color, we must also perceive the line that separates one color from another (Met. Lect. 27). The result he has reached is summed up: "We have seen first that we have sensations secondly, that we have ideas, the copies of these sensations thirdly, that those ideas are sometimes simple, the copies of one sensation; sometimes complex, the copies of several sensations so combined as to appear not several ideas but one idea and, fourthly, that we have trains of these ideas, or one succeeding another without end."
He turns to naming (Chap. IV.), and treats of the various parts of speech, but throws little light on them. He goes on to explain the various processes of the mind, beginning with consciousness (Chap. V.). " To say I feel a sensation, is merely to say I feel a feeling, which is an impropriety of speech; and to say I am conscious of a feeling is merely to say that I feel it. To have a feeling is to be conscious, and to be conscious is to have a feeling." "In the very word 'feeling' all that is implied in the word 'consciousness' is involved." There is a palpable oversight here. When I feel a sensation it is of a sensitive organ as affected, and knowledge is involved in this. To be conscious is to know self as feeling or in some other state. " When I smell a rose, I am conscious." True, but I am conscious not of the rose, but of self as having the sensation. In explaining consciousness, he overlooks the very peculiarity of the thing to be explained.
He then (Chap. V., VI., VII., VIII., IX.) treats of conception, imagination, classification, abstraction. " Conception applies only to ideas and to ideas only in a state of combination. It is a general name, including the several classes of complex {382} ideas." But the question arises, What intellectual bond combines things generally? and we have no satisfactory answer. He thus misses one of the most important capacities of our mental nature. " An imagination is the name of a train but what combines so many scattered things into one image, often so grand? He has a long disquisition on classification. The word `man,' we shall say, is first applied to an individual it is first associated with the idea of that individual, and acquires the power of calling up the idea of him; it is next applied to another individual, and acquires the power of calling tip the idea of him, so of another and another, till it has become associated with an infinite number, and has acquired the power of calling up an indefinite number of these ideas indifferently." " It is association that forms the ideas of an indefinite number of individuals into one complex idea." Here again he has explained every thing by overlooking the