The Scottish Philosophy [242]
collocations of matter rather than the laws of matter that he draws his argument for the divine existence. The distinction seems to be deep in the constitution of things, but might be better represented, perhaps, as the distinction between the properties of matter and the dispositions of matter, these dispositions manifesting design, and consequently intelligence.
He is most successful when he is arguing from the constitution of the human mind. He dwells with great fondness and force on the supremacy of conscience and the inherent pleasure of virtuous and the misery of vicious affections, and gives a powerful exposition of the law of habit. He has a clear, masterly, and eloquent exposition of Leibnitz's theory of the origin of evil, not positively adopting it, but using it as an hypothesis to obviate objections. Here and elsewhere he unfolds a very favorite principle, that hypotheses may be advanced in theology to answer objections even when they do not establish positive truth. The logical meaning of this principle is that the hypothesis sets aside the unlimited major premise necessary to establish the infidel objection. He seeks to answer the objection to prayer drawn from the uniformity and fixed character of the laws of nature by showing that we can trace the agencies of nature only a little way back, and that interferences may take place in that outer region which lies beyond the ken of man. It may be replied that, by just inference, we can trace the agencies far beyond the immediate inspection of man, and that we find them everywhere uniform. It might be wiser in these circumstances to trace up both the prayer and its answer to the pre- established harmony of things appointed by God. He closes his work by showing that natural theology is as useful in exhibiting man's needs, and thus preparing him to receive the remedial complement supplied by the Bible, as even in the positive truths which it has established.
We have seen in the cases of Stewart, Brown, and Mackintosh what difficulties those trained in the Scottish metaphysics had in comprehending the German philosophy and accepting the truth. Hamilton, we shall find, labored to combine the two. Chalmers, meanwhile, was engrossed with philanthropic work; he did not understand the German language, and it was not till the last year of his life, when he got a little lull in 1847 after the disruption storm, that he became acquainted with the {404} German philosophy, to which he was introduced by Mr. J. D. Morell's well-written and interesting work, " An Historical and Critical View of the Speculative Philosophy of Europe in the Nineteenth Century." He entered on the study with a youthful enthusiasm, and reviewed the work in the " North British Review." " It is long since an), work has made its appearance before a public in a state of greater expectancy and readiness for its lessons." With a mind of similar openness and candor, he is ready to receive whatever truth Kant and the Germans may offer. He confesses his gratification on finding, "amid all these conflicting systems and speculations, that our theology is safe." He rejoices to find profound points of agreement between Reid and Kant, and is willing to take the truth in either form. " Now, for comparing the Scottish and German philosophies, whether as it respects their similarities or their differences, it is of importance to mark how these primary beliefs of Dr. Reid are at one with the primitive arguments of Kant, or with his forms of the understanding. They may have been the better named by the latter of these two philosophers he may have probed more deeply into their foundations, or, rather, perhaps, into their method of development; he may have constructed a fuller and more accurate list of them, and, without pronouncing on his scheme for their application, or by which he would bring his categories to bear on the objects of the external world, it might be fully conceded that, altogether, be has enlarged and in some respects amended the philosophy of Dr. Reid. Yet let us not, because of the altered
He is most successful when he is arguing from the constitution of the human mind. He dwells with great fondness and force on the supremacy of conscience and the inherent pleasure of virtuous and the misery of vicious affections, and gives a powerful exposition of the law of habit. He has a clear, masterly, and eloquent exposition of Leibnitz's theory of the origin of evil, not positively adopting it, but using it as an hypothesis to obviate objections. Here and elsewhere he unfolds a very favorite principle, that hypotheses may be advanced in theology to answer objections even when they do not establish positive truth. The logical meaning of this principle is that the hypothesis sets aside the unlimited major premise necessary to establish the infidel objection. He seeks to answer the objection to prayer drawn from the uniformity and fixed character of the laws of nature by showing that we can trace the agencies of nature only a little way back, and that interferences may take place in that outer region which lies beyond the ken of man. It may be replied that, by just inference, we can trace the agencies far beyond the immediate inspection of man, and that we find them everywhere uniform. It might be wiser in these circumstances to trace up both the prayer and its answer to the pre- established harmony of things appointed by God. He closes his work by showing that natural theology is as useful in exhibiting man's needs, and thus preparing him to receive the remedial complement supplied by the Bible, as even in the positive truths which it has established.
We have seen in the cases of Stewart, Brown, and Mackintosh what difficulties those trained in the Scottish metaphysics had in comprehending the German philosophy and accepting the truth. Hamilton, we shall find, labored to combine the two. Chalmers, meanwhile, was engrossed with philanthropic work; he did not understand the German language, and it was not till the last year of his life, when he got a little lull in 1847 after the disruption storm, that he became acquainted with the {404} German philosophy, to which he was introduced by Mr. J. D. Morell's well-written and interesting work, " An Historical and Critical View of the Speculative Philosophy of Europe in the Nineteenth Century." He entered on the study with a youthful enthusiasm, and reviewed the work in the " North British Review." " It is long since an), work has made its appearance before a public in a state of greater expectancy and readiness for its lessons." With a mind of similar openness and candor, he is ready to receive whatever truth Kant and the Germans may offer. He confesses his gratification on finding, "amid all these conflicting systems and speculations, that our theology is safe." He rejoices to find profound points of agreement between Reid and Kant, and is willing to take the truth in either form. " Now, for comparing the Scottish and German philosophies, whether as it respects their similarities or their differences, it is of importance to mark how these primary beliefs of Dr. Reid are at one with the primitive arguments of Kant, or with his forms of the understanding. They may have been the better named by the latter of these two philosophers he may have probed more deeply into their foundations, or, rather, perhaps, into their method of development; he may have constructed a fuller and more accurate list of them, and, without pronouncing on his scheme for their application, or by which he would bring his categories to bear on the objects of the external world, it might be fully conceded that, altogether, be has enlarged and in some respects amended the philosophy of Dr. Reid. Yet let us not, because of the altered