The Scottish Philosophy [30]
long section on " Dean Berkeley's scheme." He was one of the first who examined systematically the new theory. He takes the obvious and vulgar view of it, and not the refined one ascribed to the ingenious author by his admirers: for those who have opposed Berkeley have usually given one account of his system, while those who have defended him have usually given another; and some have thence come to the conclusion, that his whole theory is so ethereal that it is not capable of definite expression. Baxter maintains that " we perceive, besides our sensations themselves, the objects of them that " we are conscious not only of sensation excited, but that it is excited by some cause beside ourselves," and that "such objects as rivers, houses, mountains, are the very things we perceive by sense." He endeavors to prove that the system of Berkeley carried out consistently would land us in a solitary egoism, for " we only collect concerning the souls of other men from the spontaneous motions and actions of their bodies; these, according to him, belong to nothing." Berkeley had boasted that, by expelling matter out of nature, he had dragged with it so many sceptical and impious notions; Baxter replies that this " puts us into a way of denying all things, that we may get rid of the absurdity of those who deny some things," -- " as if one should advance that the best way for a woman who may silence those who attack her reputation is to turn a common prostitute." He thinks that the doctrine may tend to remove the checks to immorality; for "he who thinks theft, murder, or adultery nothing real beyond bare idea, and that for aught we know be injures nobody, will be surely under less restraint to satisfy his Declinations of any kind." The mathematician is evidently annoyed and vexed at the attacks which Berkeley bad made on his science, and shows "that if there be no such thing as quantity, we have a large body of immutable truths conversant about an impossible object."
In examining Berkeley he gives his views of sense- perception, which are not so clear and satisfactory as those of Reid; but are vastly juster than those of his contemporaries. He distinctly separates himself from those who hold that the mind can perceive nothing but its own states. " If our ideas have no parts, and yet if we perceive parts, it is plain we perceive something more than our own perceptions." He adds "We are conscious that we perceive parts as that we have perceptions at all." The {49} existence of matter in general, or at least of material sensories to which the soul is united, seems to me to be nearer intuitive than demonstrative knowledge." He declares that the "same perception of parts proves to us both the spirit and a material agency." This is so far an anticipation of the doctrine of Hamilton as an advance upon that of Reid. As to the manner of the action of matter on spirit, and spirit on matter, he says, in the very spirit of Reid. " We are certain this is matter of fact in many instances, whether we conceive it or not." He adds, in his own manner: " The Deity himself moves matter in almost all the phenomena of nature, and the soul of man perhaps moves some matter of the body, though in an infinitely less degree."
VII. -- FRANCIS HUTCHESON.[11] D/URING\ the greater part of the seventeenth century there was a constant immigration into the north-east of Ireland of Scotch men, who carried with them their hardy mode of life and persevering habits; their love of education and their anxiety to have an educated ministry; their attachment to the Bible and the simple Presbyterian worship. This movement commenced with the attempt of the first James of England to civilize Ireland by the Plantation of Ulster, and was continued during the period of the prelatic persecution in Scotland, whereby not a few sturdy adherents of the Solemn League and Covenant were driven for refuge to the sister isle. The Scottish Church kept a watchful guardianship over her scattered children, and sent after them a succession
In examining Berkeley he gives his views of sense- perception, which are not so clear and satisfactory as those of Reid; but are vastly juster than those of his contemporaries. He distinctly separates himself from those who hold that the mind can perceive nothing but its own states. " If our ideas have no parts, and yet if we perceive parts, it is plain we perceive something more than our own perceptions." He adds "We are conscious that we perceive parts as that we have perceptions at all." The {49} existence of matter in general, or at least of material sensories to which the soul is united, seems to me to be nearer intuitive than demonstrative knowledge." He declares that the "same perception of parts proves to us both the spirit and a material agency." This is so far an anticipation of the doctrine of Hamilton as an advance upon that of Reid. As to the manner of the action of matter on spirit, and spirit on matter, he says, in the very spirit of Reid. " We are certain this is matter of fact in many instances, whether we conceive it or not." He adds, in his own manner: " The Deity himself moves matter in almost all the phenomena of nature, and the soul of man perhaps moves some matter of the body, though in an infinitely less degree."
VII. -- FRANCIS HUTCHESON.[11] D/URING\ the greater part of the seventeenth century there was a constant immigration into the north-east of Ireland of Scotch men, who carried with them their hardy mode of life and persevering habits; their love of education and their anxiety to have an educated ministry; their attachment to the Bible and the simple Presbyterian worship. This movement commenced with the attempt of the first James of England to civilize Ireland by the Plantation of Ulster, and was continued during the period of the prelatic persecution in Scotland, whereby not a few sturdy adherents of the Solemn League and Covenant were driven for refuge to the sister isle. The Scottish Church kept a watchful guardianship over her scattered children, and sent after them a succession