The Scottish Philosophy [45]
to space and time, he avoids the extreme positions both of Clarke, who represents them as modes of the divine being, and of Leibnitz, who describes them as mere relations perceived by the mind. He represents them as things or realities, and declares modestly and truly that we are ignorant of the relation in which they stand towards the divine nature. These judicious views were followed by the Scottish metaphysicians generally down to the time of Hamilton.
This leads him into the investigation of the infinite. He regards the following propositions as probable: that it is scarcely possible that there should be a number of infinite things of the same kind , that the infinite, because it is infinite, cannot be greater; that infinites, so far as infinites, cannot be multiplied; nor can have any finite relation () to finite parts, although things by one reason infinite and by another finite may be divided and multiplied, if only there are other things of the same description. But after enunciating these bold propositions he cautiously adds that these questions may well be held to surpass human capacity.
He declares that, properly speaking, there is only one sort of cause, the efficient. He says that in the impulse and motion of bodies, and in the effort to change the idea in our minds, and to produce motions in our bodily members, we not only see change, but perceive some energy or efficacy. This view is not thoroughly carried out; it certainly is the truth so far as {75} it goes. He cautions us, in the very spirit of Reid, against dogmatizing too minutely as to the power of the mind over the body.
Substance is that which remains when the affections change. He agrees with Locke that the nature of substance is unknown, except that we have an obscure idea of something as the substratum of qualities. His views on this whole subject are meagre and unsatisfactory.
Still it is in the discussion of these questions that he passes beyond Shaftesbury, and shows the clearness, the judiciousness, and the independence of his thinking. I am not sure whether these metaphysical topics have been discussed in a profounder manner by any thinker of the Scottish school except Sir W. Hamilton; and he has not shown the same amount of speculative caution and good sense as Hutcheson.
But Hutcheson dwells far more on the motive and moral parts of man's nature than on logical and metaphysical subjects. We have seen that he brings in many other senses besides the external ones. He defines sense, " every determination of our minds to receive ideas independently on our will, and to have perceptions of pleasure and pain." The following is his classification of them: " (1) In the first class are the external senses, universally known. (2) In the second, the pleasant perceptions arising from regular harmonious uniform objects, as also from grandeur and novelty. These we may call, after Mr. Addison, the `pleasures of the imagination,' or we may call the power of receiving them an internal sense. Whoever dislikes this name may substitute another. (3) The next class of perceptions we may call a public sense; viz., our determination to be pleased with the happiness of others, and to be uneasy at their misery. This is found in some degree in all men, and was sometimes called [Greek term], or, by the ancients; this inward pain or compassion cannot be called a sensation of sight. It solely arises from an opinion of misery felt by another, and not immediately from a visible form. The same form presented to the eye by the exactest painting, or the action of a player, gives no pain to those who remember that' there is no misery felt. When men by imagination conceive real pain felt by an actor, without recollecting that it is merely {76} feigned, or when they think of the real story represented, then, as there is a confused opinion of real misery, there is also pain in compassion. (4) The fourth class we may call the moral sense, by which we perceive virtue or vice in ourselves or others. This is plainly
This leads him into the investigation of the infinite. He regards the following propositions as probable: that it is scarcely possible that there should be a number of infinite things of the same kind , that the infinite, because it is infinite, cannot be greater; that infinites, so far as infinites, cannot be multiplied; nor can have any finite relation (
He declares that, properly speaking, there is only one sort of cause, the efficient. He says that in the impulse and motion of bodies, and in the effort to change the idea in our minds, and to produce motions in our bodily members, we not only see change, but perceive some energy or efficacy. This view is not thoroughly carried out; it certainly is the truth so far as {75} it goes. He cautions us, in the very spirit of Reid, against dogmatizing too minutely as to the power of the mind over the body.
Substance is that which remains when the affections change. He agrees with Locke that the nature of substance is unknown, except that we have an obscure idea of something as the substratum of qualities. His views on this whole subject are meagre and unsatisfactory.
Still it is in the discussion of these questions that he passes beyond Shaftesbury, and shows the clearness, the judiciousness, and the independence of his thinking. I am not sure whether these metaphysical topics have been discussed in a profounder manner by any thinker of the Scottish school except Sir W. Hamilton; and he has not shown the same amount of speculative caution and good sense as Hutcheson.
But Hutcheson dwells far more on the motive and moral parts of man's nature than on logical and metaphysical subjects. We have seen that he brings in many other senses besides the external ones. He defines sense, " every determination of our minds to receive ideas independently on our will, and to have perceptions of pleasure and pain." The following is his classification of them: " (1) In the first class are the external senses, universally known. (2) In the second, the pleasant perceptions arising from regular harmonious uniform objects, as also from grandeur and novelty. These we may call, after Mr. Addison, the `pleasures of the imagination,' or we may call the power of receiving them an internal sense. Whoever dislikes this name may substitute another. (3) The next class of perceptions we may call a public sense; viz., our determination to be pleased with the happiness of others, and to be uneasy at their misery. This is found in some degree in all men, and was sometimes called [Greek term], or