The Scottish Philosophy [89]
peculiar kind; and he should have inquired, which he has not done, into its nature, when he would have seen that it possesses an essential freedom. As not perceiving this, he has left nothing to save man from being driven on by an iron necessity.
In Book Third, he treats of morals, and starts his utilitarian theory, which, however, he develops more fully, and in a livelier, more pointed, and ornate manner, in his essay, ,An Inquiry concerning the Principles of Morals." He says of this work, that it is " of all my writings, historical, philosophical, or literary, incomparably the best." In respect of practical influence, {150} it has certainly been the most important. By his speculative doubts in regard to the operations of the under standing he has furnished a gymnastic to metaphysicians ever since his time; but by his theory of virtue he has swayed belief and practice.
He shows that we cannot distinguish between good and evil by reason alone, defining reason as the discovery of truth or false hood, and truth and falsehood as consisting in the agreement or disagreement, either to the real relation of ideas, or to real existence and matter of fact. Taking reason in this sense, it certainly cannot be said to discern the morally good. But then it may be maintained that the mind has a power of discerning moral good and evil analogous to the reason which distinguishes truth and falsehood, and all that he could urge in opposition would be, that such a view is inconsistent with his theory of impressions and ideas. It is by no means clear what is the faculty or feeling to which he allots the function of perceiving and approving the morally good. Sometimes he seems to make man a selfish being, swayed only by motives of pleasure or pain; and in this view virtue is to be regarded as good, because associated directly or indirectly with the pleasure it would bring to ourselves. But in other places he calls in a " benevolent sentiment, leading us to approve what is useful." Hume's general theory might certainly seem op posed to every thing, and yet, in criticising Locke, he is obliged to say: " I should desire to know what can be meant by asserting that self-love or resentment of injuries, or passion between the sexes, is not innate." We have already quoted passages in which he appeals to instincts. He says elsewhere, "The mind, by an instinct, tends to unite itself with the good, and avoid the evil." At times he seems to adhere to the theory of Shaftesbury and Hutcheson, as to the existence of a moral sense. "The mind of man is so formed by nature, that upon the appearance of certain characters, dispositions, and actions, it immediately feels the sentiment of approbation or blame." He tells us expressly that he is inclined to think it probable that the final sentence in regard to moral excellence "depends on some internal sense or feeling which nature has made universal in the whole species." I believe that we cannot account for the ideas in the mind except by calling in {151} such a faculty or feeling; and it was his business, as an experimental inquirer, to ascertain all that is in this power, and to determine its mode of operation and its laws. But such an investigation would have overthrown his whole theory, metaphysical as well as ethical.
According to Hume, virtue consists in the agreeable and useful. "Vice and virtue may be compared to sounds, colors, heat and cold, which, according to modern philosophy, are not qualities in objects, but perceptions in the mind." " Virtue is distinguished by the pleasure, and vice by the pain, that any action, sentiment, or character gives us by the mere view and contemplation." This theory goes a step farther than that of Hutcheson in the same direction. Hutcheson placed virtue in benevolence, thereby making the intention of the agent necessary to virtue; whereas Hume does not regard it as necessary that it should be voluntary, and requires us to look merely to the act and its tendency. His definition might lead one to think that an easy road or a pleasant
In Book Third, he treats of morals, and starts his utilitarian theory, which, however, he develops more fully, and in a livelier, more pointed, and ornate manner, in his essay, ,An Inquiry concerning the Principles of Morals." He says of this work, that it is " of all my writings, historical, philosophical, or literary, incomparably the best." In respect of practical influence, {150} it has certainly been the most important. By his speculative doubts in regard to the operations of the under standing he has furnished a gymnastic to metaphysicians ever since his time; but by his theory of virtue he has swayed belief and practice.
He shows that we cannot distinguish between good and evil by reason alone, defining reason as the discovery of truth or false hood, and truth and falsehood as consisting in the agreement or disagreement, either to the real relation of ideas, or to real existence and matter of fact. Taking reason in this sense, it certainly cannot be said to discern the morally good. But then it may be maintained that the mind has a power of discerning moral good and evil analogous to the reason which distinguishes truth and falsehood, and all that he could urge in opposition would be, that such a view is inconsistent with his theory of impressions and ideas. It is by no means clear what is the faculty or feeling to which he allots the function of perceiving and approving the morally good. Sometimes he seems to make man a selfish being, swayed only by motives of pleasure or pain; and in this view virtue is to be regarded as good, because associated directly or indirectly with the pleasure it would bring to ourselves. But in other places he calls in a " benevolent sentiment, leading us to approve what is useful." Hume's general theory might certainly seem op posed to every thing
According to Hume, virtue consists in the agreeable and useful. "Vice and virtue may be compared to sounds, colors, heat and cold, which, according to modern philosophy, are not qualities in objects, but perceptions in the mind." " Virtue is distinguished by the pleasure, and vice by the pain, that any action, sentiment, or character gives us by the mere view and contemplation." This theory goes a step farther than that of Hutcheson in the same direction. Hutcheson placed virtue in benevolence, thereby making the intention of the agent necessary to virtue; whereas Hume does not regard it as necessary that it should be voluntary, and requires us to look merely to the act and its tendency. His definition might lead one to think that an easy road or a pleasant