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such a war is “REMOTE”!!’ Dreyer formed a good first impression of Steptoe (‘I like him very much and think he is very intelligent’), but the navy’s relations with SIS in the Far East began to sour towards the end of 1933 over the Service’s lack of progress in obtaining intelligence on Japan. Tasked by Sinclair on the matter, Steptoe explained the particular problems presented by the Japanese target. ‘Every effort’, he claimed, had been made ‘to find a person who will take over our Organization in [Japan] as a whole time job’. But ‘to do the work successfully’ it was ‘imperative’ that the person had fluent Japanese and, in any case, the growing climate of xenophobia and suspicion in Japan made any initiative extremely risky: ‘to attempt to build up an organisation now, when every foreigner is so closely watched, and the spy scare so prevalent is, if not an impossible task, an exceedingly delicate one’. A further difficulty was the attitude of the British ambassador, Sir Francis Lindley, who strongly opposed the use of the embassy for SIS work or communications.

The navy’s dissatisfaction with SIS was reinforced by Captain W. E. C. Tait, the Deputy Director of Naval Intelligence, who, in the light of Japan’s increasingly aggressive ‘policy of expansion in the Far East’, had been sent out at the end of 1933 to report on the naval intelligence position. Tait, who proposed that a new regional inter-service intelligence office be established in Hong Kong (which later emerged as the Far East Combined Bureau), was very critical of SIS, especially in relation to the lack of information supplied on Japan, Formosa and the Pescadores. He complained about Steptoe’s apparently cultivated air of secretiveness, which had served to undermine his reputation. ‘Secretiveness and mystery’, wrote Tait, ‘are accepted only as long as people are ready to believe there is something behind them. Once there creeps a doubt into this frame of mind, the very secretive precautions that are taken only increase suspicions, until it is honestly believed by some that there is a lot of mystery about C.X. [Steptoe] and very little else.’ Steptoe, as a result, was ‘to a certain extent discredited’.18

By April 1934 Dreyer, too, had lost confidence in Steptoe. While he conceded that Steptoe was ‘an adept’ and had ‘considerable flair’ for ‘Chinese political forecasts’, what Dreyer wanted was ‘actual facts concerning fortifications’ and ‘warnings of definite preparations for hostilities in Japan or any of her possessions’. Steptoe ‘talks too much’, Dreyer told Sinclair, and his ‘indiscreet and boastful talk has left no doubt on people’s minds generally as to what his real functions are. Perhaps’, he added facetiously, ‘Steptoe is only a dummy and you have a real S.I.S. working quite independent of him.’ Dreyer suggested that, so well known was Steptoe’s real role, his ‘presence alone would be quite enough to destroy any S.I.S. organisation which may be built up, just when we need it most. Or perhaps our little yellow friends will push him into the Whangpoa [Huangpu River, which runs through Shanghai] without further ado when their time comes.’

Having become aware of Dreyer’s criticisms, Steptoe offered to resign, but Sinclair loyally backed his man. ‘You still retain my complete confidence and the fact that you do not agree with senior officials belonging to other departments is no reason for your resigning from the S.I.S. If this were so,’ he continued, ‘I should have to resign from my position several times every week.’ All the same, the Service’s failure to obtain ‘Japanese Naval and Military information’ was recognised in Broadway and, on Vivian’s suggestion, in June 1934 Sinclair decided to appoint a new representative to be based at Hong Kong to take over the Japanese target from Steptoe.

The failure of SIS and Steptoe in Japan in the early 1930s stemmed from a combination of scarce resources, which (among other reasons) obliged SIS to persevere with 28000’s one-man-band operation; progressively increasing demands for information, especially from the armed