The Secret History of MI6 - Keith Jeffery [315]
By October 1943 Agir had located over a hundred V-1 sites, and Hollard, who had ‘an arrangement’ with the Chef de Gare at Rouen, was able to measure and take a series of photographs of a railway truck-load of V-1s. In addition, he stole an architect’s blueprint of a V-1 site which allowed London to construct an exact scale model which, complemented with photo-reconnaissance, enabled the RAF to carry out effective bombing of the sites (which Agir in turn reported on). One of Hollard’s sub-agents, ‘Z.187’, was an eighteen-year-old Frenchman who came to the British mission in Berne hoping to go on to England to join the Free French forces. When told that this was not possible he offered to work as an agent. SIS arranged for him to be taken on by Swiss Military Intelligence (which facilitated crossing and recrossing the frontier) and simultaneously join the Agir organisation. He helped identify V-1 sites and pinpointed the first V-2 launching site at Watten, near Calais. He also regularly supplied conventional military intelligence, among which was a German General Staff map showing the deployment of an infantry division in the Pas de Calais region – alleged to have been specially prepared for an inspection tour by Hitler – in ‘complete detail down to platoon formations, with all the defence works drawn in, including underwater anti-tank and anti-personnel obstacles along the shore’. Z.187 was caught in June 1944 and never heard of again, presumed shot by the Gestapo. Hollard was more fortunate. Having crossed the Swiss frontier ninety-eight times before being betrayed and arrested in February 1944, he survived the war.17
SIS and D-Day
Operation Overlord, the successful invasion of France on 6 June 1944, in which some 150,000 troops were landed at a cost of little over 5,000 casualties, was a stunning achievement in terms of Allied and inter-service co-operation, careful planning, logistics, timing and, not least, the courage of the individual soldiers, sailors and airmen involved. It was also a tremendous intelligence success. Indeed, no previous military operation in history had been so well supported and sustained by the intelligence available for the assault and its range and quality were a testament to the combined efforts of many agencies: signals intelligence from Bletchley Park; aerial reconnaissance from the RAF; deception operations run by the XX Committee; and detailed surveys of the beaches themselves obtained by COPPs (Combined Operations Pilotage Parties), sometimes lying offshore for days in midget submarines measuring tidal currents and beach gradients and taking sand samples.18 But there were limitations to what could be done. Signals intelligence, for example, which was so valuable where the enemy used wireless, could provide