The Secret History of MI6 - Keith Jeffery [318]
On 11 May Menzies told Peter Loxley that while SIS had prepared a list of possible targets (which he was not as yet forwarding to him), the Service did not believe that their removal would ‘have much, or indeed any effect on the efficient functioning of so widespread and highly organised a machine’ as the Germans had in France. He also recommended that Loxley consult Bill Cavendish-Bentinck, the chairman of the Joint Intelligence Sub-Committee, on the matter. Cavendish-Bentinck agreed with Menzies ‘in disliking this scheme, not out of squeamishness, as there are several people in this world whom I could kill with my own hands with a feeling of pleasure and without that action in any way spoiling my appetite’, but because it was ‘the type of bright idea which in the end produces a good deal of trouble and does little good’. Above all there was the risk of bloody reprisals. Nevertheless, if the French liked ‘to assassinate Germans or collaborators’, he added, ‘we should not deter them’, but ‘we should steer clear of this business’ and ‘should not ourselves designate persons to be liquidated, either German or still less French’. He noted the likelihood ‘that for every successful assassination’ there would be ‘two or three failures’ and observed that ‘if assassination were easy many statesmen and high officers would have come to a violent end’. Looking to the future, Cavendish-Bentinck worried that if German civilian officials were murdered in France, it would ‘probably start a wave of murderings’ which might continue after the British had occupied enemy territory, ‘with the result that members of our Control and other Commissions will become poor risks for the insurance companies’. Cadogan shared these negative opinions and SHAEF were informed accordingly.24
SIS’s part in Overlord drew on its experience in North Africa and the Middle East and reflected the successful organisation which had been developed there in 1942-3. Thus, as well as the Sussex teams, echoing SIS’s No. 1 Intelligence Unit which had been attached to Alexander’s 15th Army Group in Italy, No. 2 Intelligence (Unit) Section (or, more succinctly, but no more revealingly, No. 2 I(U) Section) was attached to the headquarters of General Montgomery’s British 21st Army Group, and provided the link to SHAEF on intelligence matters, both with London and in the field. On 8 June Menzies appointed Colonel Guy Westmacott to take over the section, with an officer who had hitherto been running the Sussex programme as his deputy. In a move that signalled the start of the Service’s anticipated peacetime deployment in formerly occupied Europe, the deputy was given the symbol ‘27000’, which belonged to the head of the Paris station. He was charged with obtaining