The Snowball_ Warren Buffett and the Business of Life - Alice Schroeder [573]
52. The firm would still do business as an “agent,” which meant it would buy only if it had another buyer in hand to which it could resell the notes.
53. Kurt Eichenwald, “Wall Street Sees a Serious Threat to Salomon Bros.—ILLEGAL BIDDING FALLOUT—High-Level Resignations and Client Defections Feared—Firm’s Stock Drops,” New York Times, August 16, 1991.
54. Interview with Jerry Corrigan.
55. Strauss later related this to Buffett.
56. Interview with Jerry Corrigan.
57. Interview with Jerry Corrigan.
58. Interview with Jerry Corrigan. He says that Strauss and Gutfreund had had more than one routine conversation with him between April and June without mentioning anything, and he no longer trusted them.
59. Buffett arrived in New York between 2:30 and 3:00 p.m., during which time the press release would have been drafted and ready to go.
60. From Salomon press release dated August 16, 1991: “In order to give the Salomon Inc., board of directors maximum flexibility, they are prepared to submit their resignations at a special meeting of the board.”
61. Interview with Eric Rosenfeld.
62. Interview with Bill McIntosh, Tom Strauss, Deryck Maughan.
63. Interview with Tom Strauss.
64. Interview with Jerry Corrigan.
65. Interview with Ron Olson.
66. Warren Buffett testimony, “In the Matter of Arbitration Between John H. Gutfreund against Salomon Inc., and Salomon Brothers Inc.” Sessions 13 & 14, November 29, 1993.
67. This is Buffett’s recollection of Gutfreund’s remarks. (From Warren Buffett testimony, “In the Matter of Arbitration Between John H. Gutfreund against Salomon Inc., and Salomon Brothers Inc.,” Sessions 13 & 14, November 29, 1993.
68. Interview with Tom Strauss.
69. On October 8, 1991, he was displaced when the Walton family, owners of Wal-Mart stock, took over spots 3-7; Buffett became number 8. Entertainment mogul John Kluge and Bill Gates occupied the top two spots.
70. Through a routine letter to Mercury Asset Management when the Treasury Department discovered that Mercury, together with its affiliate S. G. Warburg & Co., had submitted bids for greater than the 35% limit rule for the auction. Mozer had submitted one of these bids without Mercury’s authority. Mozer was copied on this letter and covered it up by telling Mercury that Salomon had mistakenly submitted this bid in its name—and was going to correct it, so no need to bother responding to the Treasury. (Statement of Salomon Inc., submitted in conjunction with the Testimony of Warren E. Buffett, Chairman and CEO of Salomon. Before the Securities Subcommittee, Committee of Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs, U.S. Senate, September 10, 1991.)
71. Interview with Deryck Maughan.
72. Speech to students in 1994 at University of North Carolina Kenan-Flagler Business School.
73. The one exception was Stanley Shopkorn, who ran the equities division and, by others’ recollections, thought he should get the job.
74. Michael Lewis, Liar’s Poker.
75. Ibid.
76. Swope fired them all and turned the firm into a radical Black Power, “Truth & Soul” agency.
77. Interview with Deryck Maughan.
78. Interview with Eric Rosenfeld, who says no threats were made. But because Meriwether was not bound by a noncompete, it was obvious that the whole arb team would leave sooner or later.
79. Gutfreund told Buffett that Susan was telling him he was unemployable.
80. Interview with Philip Howard. Warren Buffett testimony, “In the Matter of Arbitration Between John H. Gutfreund against Salomon Inc., and Salomon Brothers Inc.,” Sessions 13 & 14, November 29, 1993.
81. Interview with Warren Buffett; Warren Buffett testimony, “In the Matter of Arbitration Between John H. Gutfreund against Salomon Inc., and Salomon Brothers Inc.,” Sessions 13 & 14, November 29, 1993, cited this remark as evidence that Gutfreund knew he did not have a deal. (Munger