The Story of Mankind [114]
dangerous economic sickness, known as ``Absentee
Landlordism.'' Within a single generation, the industrious
and useful feudal administrators had become the well-mannered
but quite useless loafers of the court of Versailles.
Louis was ten years old when the peace of Westphalia was
concluded and the House of Habsburg, as a result of the
Thirty Years War, lost its predominant position in Europe.
It was inevitable that a man with his ambition should use so
favourable a moment to gain for his own dynasty the honours
which had formerly been held by the Habsburgs. In the year
1660 Louis had married Maria Theresa, daughter of the King
of Spain. Soon afterward, his father-in-law, Philip IV, one
of the half-witted Spanish Habsburgs, died. At once Louis
claimed the Spanish Netherlands (Belgium) as part of his
wife's dowry. Such an acquisition would have been disastrous
to the peace of Europe, and would have threatened the safety
of the Protestant states. Under the leadership of Jan de Witt,
Raadpensionaris or Foreign Minister of the United Seven
Netherlands, the first great international alliance, the Triple
Alliance of Sweden, England and Holland, of the year 1661,
was concluded. It did not last long. With money and fair
promises Louis bought up both King Charles and the Swedish
Estates. Holland was betrayed by her allies and was left to
her own fate. In the year 1672 the French invaded the low
countries. They marched to the heart of the country. For a
second time the dikes were opened and the Royal Sun of
France set amidst the mud of the Dutch marshes. The peace
of Nimwegen which was concluded in 1678 settled nothing but
merely anticipated another war.
A second war of aggression from 1689 to 1697, ending with
the Peace of Ryswick, also failed to give Louis that position in
the affairs of Europe to which he aspired. His old enemy,
Jan de Witt, had been murdered by the Dutch rabble, but his
successor, William III (whom you met in the last chapter),
had checkmated all efforts of Louis to make France the ruler of
Europe.
The great war for the Spanish succession, begun in the
year 1701, immediately after the death of Charles II, the last
of the Spanish Habsburgs, and ended in 1713 by the Peace
of Utrecht, remained equally undecided, but it had ruined the
treasury of Louis. On land the French king had been victorious,
but the navies of England and Holland had spoiled all
hope for an ultimate French victory; besides the long struggle
had given birth to a new and fundamental principle of international
politics, which thereafter made it impossible for one
single nation to rule the whole of Europe or the whole of the
world for any length of time.
That was the so-called ``balance of power.'' It was not a
written law but for three centuries it has been obeyed as closely
as are the laws of nature. The people who originated the idea
maintained that Europe, in its nationalistic stage of development,
could only survive when there should be an absolute balance
of the many conflicting interests of the entire continent.
No single power or single dynasty must ever be allowed to
dominate the others. During the Thirty Years War, the
Habsburgs had been the victims of the application of this law.
They, however, had been unconscious victims. The issues during
that struggle were so clouded in a haze of religious strife
that we do not get a very clear view of the main tendencies
of that great conflict. But from that time on, we begin to see
how cold, economic considerations and calculations prevail in
all matters of international importance. We discover the
development of a new type of statesman, the statesman with the
personal feelings of the slide-rule and the cash-register. Jan
de Witt was the first successful exponent of this new school
of politics. William III was the first great pupil. And Louis
XIV with all his fame and glory, was the first
Landlordism.'' Within a single generation, the industrious
and useful feudal administrators had become the well-mannered
but quite useless loafers of the court of Versailles.
Louis was ten years old when the peace of Westphalia was
concluded and the House of Habsburg, as a result of the
Thirty Years War, lost its predominant position in Europe.
It was inevitable that a man with his ambition should use so
favourable a moment to gain for his own dynasty the honours
which had formerly been held by the Habsburgs. In the year
1660 Louis had married Maria Theresa, daughter of the King
of Spain. Soon afterward, his father-in-law, Philip IV, one
of the half-witted Spanish Habsburgs, died. At once Louis
claimed the Spanish Netherlands (Belgium) as part of his
wife's dowry. Such an acquisition would have been disastrous
to the peace of Europe, and would have threatened the safety
of the Protestant states. Under the leadership of Jan de Witt,
Raadpensionaris or Foreign Minister of the United Seven
Netherlands, the first great international alliance, the Triple
Alliance of Sweden, England and Holland, of the year 1661,
was concluded. It did not last long. With money and fair
promises Louis bought up both King Charles and the Swedish
Estates. Holland was betrayed by her allies and was left to
her own fate. In the year 1672 the French invaded the low
countries. They marched to the heart of the country. For a
second time the dikes were opened and the Royal Sun of
France set amidst the mud of the Dutch marshes. The peace
of Nimwegen which was concluded in 1678 settled nothing but
merely anticipated another war.
A second war of aggression from 1689 to 1697, ending with
the Peace of Ryswick, also failed to give Louis that position in
the affairs of Europe to which he aspired. His old enemy,
Jan de Witt, had been murdered by the Dutch rabble, but his
successor, William III (whom you met in the last chapter),
had checkmated all efforts of Louis to make France the ruler of
Europe.
The great war for the Spanish succession, begun in the
year 1701, immediately after the death of Charles II, the last
of the Spanish Habsburgs, and ended in 1713 by the Peace
of Utrecht, remained equally undecided, but it had ruined the
treasury of Louis. On land the French king had been victorious,
but the navies of England and Holland had spoiled all
hope for an ultimate French victory; besides the long struggle
had given birth to a new and fundamental principle of international
politics, which thereafter made it impossible for one
single nation to rule the whole of Europe or the whole of the
world for any length of time.
That was the so-called ``balance of power.'' It was not a
written law but for three centuries it has been obeyed as closely
as are the laws of nature. The people who originated the idea
maintained that Europe, in its nationalistic stage of development,
could only survive when there should be an absolute balance
of the many conflicting interests of the entire continent.
No single power or single dynasty must ever be allowed to
dominate the others. During the Thirty Years War, the
Habsburgs had been the victims of the application of this law.
They, however, had been unconscious victims. The issues during
that struggle were so clouded in a haze of religious strife
that we do not get a very clear view of the main tendencies
of that great conflict. But from that time on, we begin to see
how cold, economic considerations and calculations prevail in
all matters of international importance. We discover the
development of a new type of statesman, the statesman with the
personal feelings of the slide-rule and the cash-register. Jan
de Witt was the first successful exponent of this new school
of politics. William III was the first great pupil. And Louis
XIV with all his fame and glory, was the first