The Streets Were Paved with Gold - Ken Auletta [164]
Unlike earlier campaigns, the emphasis was not on “new priorities” for federal dollars. If there was a Maginot Line separating the candidates, it was not between who was the most “liberal” or who made the most promises, but who was primarily responsible—city or federal and bank officials—for the fiscal crisis and its resolution. On one side of the line stood Mayor Beame and former Congress-woman Bella Abzug. The thrust of their argument was that the fiscal crisis was less the fault of past city officials or policies than of federal neglect and avaricious bankers. It followed that those who caused the crisis bore primary responsibility for solving it. Though differing in style and ideology, each ran defensively: Beame was protecting his record as mayor; Bella, her liberal ideology.
Koch, Cuomo, Goodman and several others stood on the opposite side of the line, seeming to agree with the “central conclusion” of the final report of the Temporary Commission on City Finances, issued in June 1977: “The City of New York must be fundamentally reformed before its fiscal problems and the larger economic problems of New York City can be solved: incremental reform of the local government process will not suffice, even in the event that the State of New York and the federal government assume increasing responsibility for functions performed by the City of New York.” To drive home its point, Beame’s Commission challenged the conventional wisdom which holds that “welfare reform” will untangle the city’s budget conundrum. Even if the President and the Congress agreed to assume New York City’s $500 million share of welfare costs, they noted, this sum was equal to the then-anticipated 1978 budget gap. Unless the city drastically altered past spending patterns, the additional $500 million would simply be swallowed up by wage increases and new local spending. The new money would not be used—finally—to balance the budget or reduce taxes to help regenerate the local economy. It would be like offering another fix to an addict.
The report was ignored by Beame, but not by many of the other mayoral candidates. For the first time in memory, good politics and good government seemed to be in harmony. None of the contenders would promise to maintain the 50¢ subway fare—not because they didn’t want to, but because they didn’t know where the money would come from. None promised to slash crime because none of them were sure they could. With the exception of Beame, none promised to hire more police or provide more services. It used to be that citywide candidates trembled at the prospect of being pigeonholed as “pro-business.” In 1977, each competed to capture this distinction. Business tax cuts were urged by all the candidates, as were other business incentives. Once, during a September television debate, the nine Democratic and Republican pre-primary candidates were asked which rated a higher priority: cutting taxes or raising wages. Roy Goodman said he would choose to cut taxes. The others emitted indecipherable, noncommittal responses. In previous campaigns, the candidates would have clawed and leaped over each other to promise wage increases.
If the candidates changed, perhaps it was because, in many respects, the public had as well. 1977 was a year when New York voters—like voters across the nation—were registering their distaste for high taxes. They were angry about government spending and waste, about costly municipal labor settlements, about reduced city services. “The tax collector, rather than the employer—at least in New York—is the worker’s major adversary. The same tax collector, rather than the worker, is the employer’s major adversary.” These words emanated not from some Chamber of Commerce spokesman