The Super Summary of World History - Alan Dale Daniel [146]
6) A dramatic change in German political philosophy took place in 1897 after Kaiser Wilhelm II took power and decided to expand German military power on land and at sea, plus acquire additional colonies, thus upsetting the balance of power in Europe.
The direct cause of the Great War was the murder of Archduke Ferdinand, next in line to the crown of Austria, and his wife Sophie by the Black Hand, a terrorist organization sponsored by Serbia. After the assassination and the discovery that Serbia sponsored the student murderer Gavrilo Princip, Austria sent Serbia several written absolute demands; however, Serbia rejected a few. Austria gave the Serbs 48 hours to respond, and the pressure of time limited the diplomat’s ability to gather the parties for talks. Serbia asked and received from Russia assurances saying if Austria attacked Serbia, Russian mobilization and war on Austria would follow.[170] Austria, meanwhile, contacted Germany and the Kaiser responded he would support Austria if Russia declared war. Russia contacted France and France told Russia they could count on the alliance (again unconditioned), and France promised to declare war on Germany if Germany mobilized against Russia.[171]
Encased in all this maneuvering were several unseen problems. Austria asked Germany to support their position against Serbia. Diplomats always condition responses to achieve flexibility; however, the German Kaiser’s response was yes, and without conditions. Being no diplomat, the Kaiser’s response put Germany in a poor position, forfeiting all ability to leverage its uninhibited partner toward moderation. Moreover, the Kaiser answered before knowing the demands Austria sent to Serbia. A most unwise move since the Austrian demands were quite harsh. Serbia must reject the worst demands or forfeit national honor (a big no no in 1914). The unlimited German promise freed Austria to declare war if any demand suffered rejection. The 48-hour Austrian time limit for Serbia’s response denied the Great Powers time to arrange negotiations to avert war. In addition, several heads of state were absent from their capitols and were hard to reach. Worse, the underlings left in charge apparently desired war. Russia’s growing strength convinced the German military to recommend war before Russia grew any stronger. We now know the Germans and Austrians were working together to start a war against Serbia, so diplomatic actions that would stop the march to war were rebuffed by Germany. Austria’s foreign minister, Leopold von Berchtold, despised Serbia, and he pressed for war to end Serbian expansionist policies. With Germany’s backing he hoped to demolish the Serbs, but Russia had to stay out for Austria to win. Russia had backed down before when faced with a joint Austrian—German front and Berchtold hoped for a repeat, but this time it was different. Russia’s military told the Tsar that a limited mobilization was impossible and unwise, plus the Tsar wanted to avoid another humiliation at the hands of the Germans, so he ordered a full mobilization. France failed to encourage Russia to moderate its actions. For example, if Russia had initiated a limited mobilization the nervous German plans would not require action. Finally, there was the Schlieffen Plan.
The von Schlieffen Plan
Germany’s major problem involved a threatened two-front war against France in the west and Russia in the east. The alliance of France with Russia specifically sought to keep Germany under control; unfortunately, the desired cautious mindset failed to appear. Instead, desperate plans became a necessity in the German mind because of the dual alliance. The German General Staff came under immense pressure to find a way to win a two-front war rather than avoid it at all costs. The result of German thinking became the famous von Schlieffen Plan. The plan required Germany to attack France at the very outset of war with a colossal assault while a few troops moved east to hold back the Russian tidal