The Super Summary of World History - Alan Dale Daniel [191]
Kesselring analyzed the issues differently. He knew Axis logistics (supply) problems were severe in the Mediterranean, and he deeply understood supplies were fundamental to winning any war, especially a war so heavily dependent on tanks and aircraft (both gas hogs).[240] Kesselring recognized the extended supply lines of the Afrika Korps could be their undoing. The British fell back on shorter supply lines, while the German supply lines stretched ever longer. English air power consistently increased, threatening to gain air superiority, and opening the lengthy German supply lines to air attack. Malta must be taken or the Axis faced disaster on the deserts of North Africa. A stop at Tobruk, permitting resource diversions for Malta’s conquest, was critical for supply line protection. Once the supply lines were secure, Rommel could advance on Cairo or defend Tobruk. Hitler decided it was “on to Cairo,” so Rommel kept his meager resources, and Britain kept Malta. German supplies were interdicted at ever-increasing rates even as Hitler refused critical reinforcements for Rommel. This was the key decision in North Africa. On such decisions, the fate of the world often turns.
El Alamein
June to October 1942
Rommel drove eastward until he confronted a new English line north of the Qattara Depression near the tiny railroad stop of El Alamein. The British general Auchinleck decided to forego other defensive positions and retreat to El Alamein, thereby gaining time for preparing a decisive defensive line. The depression, a sinkhole in the desert impassable by tanks or mechanized units, caused a shrinking of the battlefield to a narrow strip of land between the depression and the coast. Up until this point, the armies fought on an open desert without a southern flank. Anchoring defensive positions on the coast protected the northern flank, but the southern part of any position was just hanging in the air. Rommel made good use of this, and his panzers liked rounding the exposed flank to smash it in thus causing many British retreats. Anchoring both the northern and southern flanks ended the dashing war of maneuver Rommel used so well. Instead, Rommel faced a position requiring frontal assaults and static fighting, much like World War I, wholly favoring the English.
Upon arriving at El Alamein, Rommel realized that giving the English preparation time was not a good idea; so he launched a strong frontal attack on General Auchinleck’s forces with his combined German and Italian army in June of 1942. This was the First Battle of El Alamein, and it was the deciding battle in North Africa. It was now, before the arrival of massive British reinforcements, the Afrika Korps enjoyed its best chance of breaking through the tired and demoralized British.
Rommel’s major problem was the disparity in forces. He controlled eight infantry divisions and four armored consisting of 96,000 men including 56,000 Italians; however, only two of the armored divisions were German panzers. The other two were Italian units with outdated tanks. On paper, Rommel could muster 582 tanks, but only two hundred of them were reliable panzers. To make matters worse, the Axis air forces possessed less than five hundred aircraft. The British Eighth Army fielded 150,000 troops in seven divisions, three armored divisions of 1,114 tanks, 1,000 artillery pieces, supported by 1,500 aircraft, and they had dug-in positions to defend along with exact intelligence on Rommel and his army. A simple review of the forces makes one wonder how the Germans could succeed under any scenario. To win when the forces are lopsided, maneuver is essential; and at El Alamein maneuver was subtracted from victory’s equation. Rommel nearly succeeded anyway. In his estimation, one ridge stood between him and knocking the British out of this ideal defensive area, but that one ridge held against Rommel’s exhausted men and dwindling supplies of fuel and ammunition. The defenders of Ruweisat Ridge, a medium rise of land in the middle of the