The Super Summary of World History - Alan Dale Daniel [193]
The original OKH (German army headquarters) plans called for a drive on Moscow with large forces. Plan 1 used army group center to push to Moscow with smaller but ample forces moving to take Leningrad. In OKH plan 2, the drive to Leningrad employed fewer units, and the campaign for Moscow was even larger. Adolf Hitler dismissed both plans and made up his own plan—which was not war gamed or deeply scrutinized by knowledgeable military men. The Fuehrer’s plan targeted Leningrad by removing large numbers of troops from the critical Moscow drive; thus, vital disconnects began between Hitler and his Wehrmacht army headquarters over the grand strategy. By the way, Hitler’s planning headquarters was OKW. Yep, there were two planning organizations, and Hitler disliked OKH because they had the temerity to argue with him.
Hitler made these demands late in time, and the generals could not dissuade him from this unstudied course of action. Why he demanded these changes is unknown, but Hitler often thought in economic terms rather than military terms. Gaining valuable raw materials such as oil, or cutting off others from the same, often weighed on his mind. The generals concerned themselves with demolishing the enemy’s army as quickly and efficiently as possible. OKH (army headquarters) detested Hitler’s plan, and, when time came to order the armies forward, they often shunned Hitler’s wishes and surreptitiously kept Moscow as the prime objective. Later in the campaign, Hitler completely absorbed the general’s functions and began moving forces himself, and in detail, confusing the goals of the invasion. The lethal decision changing the carefully planned offensive was another dreadful foundational decision which was irreversible.
General Guenther Blumentritt stated that Heinrich von Brauchitsch, Franz Halder, and Gerd von Rundstedt were all against the plan to invade the Soviet Union in June 1941. According to General Blumentritt:
All three realized the difficulties presented by the nature of the country from their experiences in the 1914-1918 war—above all, the difficulties of movement, reinforcement, and supply. Field Marshal von Rundstedt asked Hitler bluntly, “Have you weighed up what you are undertaking in an attack on Russia?”
The original date for the invasion was May 15, 1941, but bad weather and Italy’s Balkans problem postponed the date. Mussolini decided to invade Greece, for prestige mostly, and purposefully failed to inform Hitler of his plan. Italy’s invasion ran into trouble right away, its troops fell back, and Greek forces were soon poised to invade Italian territory. Then the English landed troops in Greece. Unable to stand idly by while his weak ally (dumb too) was invaded and his oil supplies threatened, Hitler sent his panzers into Yugoslavia and Greece. The action ended quickly as Britain fled before the Wehrmacht. Greece surrendered after German troops neared Athens. This operation was an additional example of the Wehrmacht’s superb fighting ability in 1941. On the heels of this victory, Hitler allowed a German parachute army to invade Crete. The Germans won a close fight, but the losses were heavy.[247]
Did this diversion cost precious time? The invasion date for Barbarossa moved to June 22; accordingly, about a month was lost on top of wear and tear on equipment, loss of men, fuel, and other resources. However, the German generals said bad weather delayed the invasion date, and weather histories confirm their claim.
The battles in the USSR determined the outcome of WWII. Germany was tackling a giant. It needed an excellent plan of attack, outstanding leadership, and good luck at every turn. They received none of the above. The German leadership in the field was extraordinary, and the German generals and their troops performed skillfully; but, Hitler created a shoddy plan, made farcical decisions during the struggle, and the