The Super Summary of World History - Alan Dale Daniel [196]
As if to put an exclamation point on the fact, the Soviets launched an offensive in December of 1941 with fresh armies of Siberian troops who were quite used to winter conditions. Hitler issued his customary “no retreat!” order. The German forces fell back two hundred miles in spite of the order, but the Soviet offensive finally stalled. German losses were great, but they had held. The great professionalism of the German Army came through during the Siberian offensive. Freezing, starving men, operating near frozen equipment, shot the Soviet Siberian armies to pieces. Superior German tactics and field leadership accomplished a miracle. However, the German Army was clearly diminished by the ordeal. Never again would the German Army be the force it was in June of 1941. Its equipment improved, but the men were gone. Irreplaceable men, who successfully fought from Poland to Norway, France to the Balkans, and then to Moscow’s gates were gone forever, and with them the unbeatable Wehrmacht.
No Retreat
A controversy has arisen over Hitler’s “no retreat” order given as the Siberian Army’s offensive began. Many great historians (Shier, The Rise and Fall of the Third Reich, for one) argue this order saved the German Army. They believe that without this order the German Army would have disintegrated and suffered a butchering, just as Napoleon’s army retreating from Moscow had in 1812. I do not agree. The German Army of 1941 was not Napoleon’s army. The Wehrmacht would have prevailed because of its impressive leadership and discipline. In fact, a general retreat might have saved more men and equipment. [250] We can never know what may have occurred without the order. Hitler did give the order, and no rout occurred; that much we know. Nevertheless, why did no rout occur? Was it the order, or was it the men carrying it out? The men were the key, not the order.
Thus, the German Army faltered against terrific odds and it lost significant combat power. The Wehrmacht captured a large part of the Soviet Union in 1941, and should have gone over to the defense. Most postwar generals, and the German generals in 1941, think that would have been the wise move. Germany’s Army would be on the defense, and using its superior mobility with reserves still available could have imposed significant additional casualties on the attacking Soviets. It could take years, but a moderately successful defense might have pried peace overtures out of the Soviet Union. Hitler—ever the blockhead—demanded the outright conquest of the USSR and threw away this defensive advantage.
Moving Soviet Factories to the Urals
The Soviets accomplished numerous miracles in WWII; however, the movement of their heavy industry to the Ural Mountains stands out. When it became apparent the Germans would overrun large parts of the western USSR, the Soviets dismantled their heavy factories and moved them east, well past Moscow, to the Ural Mountains. The Soviets accomplished this feat of innovation in record time, quickly putting the factories back in production. The loss of these manufacturing facilities would have extensively harmed Soviet logistics capabilities. While moving their aircraft factories, they retooled them to produce up-to-date aircraft superior to their Nazi counterparts. This was another foundational decision extensively contributing to the Soviet victory over Germany.
Meanwhile, on the other side of the world, WWII was taking another turn for the worst against the Axis, but for over a year it did not look that way.
Japan Enters the War December 7, 1941
Background
Japan had planned for a war against the United States since at least 1905[251] (the date of the Russo-Japanese War), and by 1930 America was the inevitable enemy. After 1930, militarist factions took over Japan’s government and began urging the conquest of the Far East. Even when the civilian government in Tokyo firmly opposed expansion the military did what it wanted. With Tokyo’s blessing, Korea was “annexed” as the diplomats would say at the