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By Root 1428 0

the Zimmerman Telegram of WWI. This was now a sneak attack. Admiral Yamamoto himself stated, “I can think of nothing that would infuriate the Americans more . . .” He knew America well, and realized a sneak attack would drive the United States to crush Japan. After Pearl Harbor no terms were possible. Another result of Pearl Harbor was unintended; the sneak attack completely united the heretofore deeply divided nation. Prior to the raid, the United States was split between the isolationist and those wanting to enter the European war. Roosevelt promised in a speech for his unprecedented third term that he would not send US troops into a European war. Now that Hitler was conquering Europe the promise looked increasingly dumb; however, the Japanese attack coupled with Hitler’s declaration of war on the USA freed Roosevelt and Congress from any restraints.

Figure 56 Pearl Harbor Air Raid, December 7, 1941

The Pearl Harbor raid destroyed the mighty US battleships, but ships at sea dodged destruction and three US aircraft carriers, the raid’s main target, were at sea. This was blind luck and nothing else. Japan’s bad luck should include the fact that the Japanese took several precautions to ensure the carriers were at Pearl before the attack, but every one of the precautions failed. Providence dispensed two vital breaks to the United States of America: the first was an attack coupled with a political blunder that united the nation as nothing else could, and second was the miraculous deliverance of all its most vital aircraft carriers.

Admiral Nagumo, the leader of the strike force hitting Pearl Harbor, decided to forgo the third wave attack on Pearl Harbor aimed at the construction yards, dry docks, and oil facilities. Because of this decision, made over the objections of the officers on his bridge, the United States was to have critical dry dock and oil facilities throughout the coming months when the Japanese had the edge in the Pacific. It was a poor decision, but Nagumo’s reasoning contained a bit of logic. He knew his force of six aircraft carriers were essential for the main thrust into the Southern Pacific. Nagumo also realized his main targets were not at Pearl Harbor, and he did not know where they were. If a US carrier surprised him he might have one or more of his carriers lost or heavily damaged. Nagumo stated it was going to be a long war (a different attitude from some of his superiors) and the aircraft, pilots, and ships would be needed. He did not want to lose them on a mission to tidy up the attack on Pearl Harbor. Nagumo’s first wave had lost 9 aircraft, but his second wave lost 20. A third wave assault might cost a lot more. In addition, waiting around for a third wave to return would take hours, and every hour exposed his fleet to assault by US submarines or carriers. His objective, crippling the US Fleet, was attained, so why incur additional risks?

Looking back over sixty years Nagumo’s error appears appalling; however, we should try to put ourselves into the situation at the time of the attack and realize Nagumo focused on a broader picture that included the South Pacific. What really hurts Nagumo, from a historian’s point of view, is all his fellow officers were in favor of the third wave assault. None-the-less, Nagumo’s strike force sunk the US Fleet at a cost of 29 aircraft lost. A cheap victory.

Japans’ Southern Offensive

1941 & 1942

Japan’s southern offensive was superlative. The closely planned attacks went off precisely and professionally with spectacular results. Everywhere Japan was ascendant. On most islands, such as Dutch Borneo, there was virtually no resistance, although Dutch engineers set the oil fields on fire, and the Japanese beheaded them for their trouble. Hong Kong, after light resistance, surrendered on Christmas Day 1941. There were two keys to the region: Singapore at the end of the Malay Peninsula (British), and Manila Bay in the Philippines (American). In both cases troops were available in sufficient numbers to put up a good fight, but in both cases, Japanese commanders