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the US aircraft carriers now, before the US Fleet recovered from its defeats. The Japanese high command wanted to continue the push to the south and draw the US Fleet into an action there. Yamamoto argued the US Navy must believe a vital asset was in jeopardy before they would choose to do battle with the more powerful Japanese Combined Fleet. He believed actions in the south would not draw the US Navy into battle. By attacking and seizing Midway Island he threatened Pearl Harbor by putting it in bomber range. The Doolittle raid on Tokyo (April 18, 1942) decided the matter.[267] If a US carrier task force could threaten the emperor[268] that threat must be eliminated; thus, the high command agreed to Yamamoto’s plan but with substantial changes.

Admiral Yamamoto’s plan was overly complex. It divided his forces in the face of the enemy, and it assumed the Americans would not fight unless forced to by dire circumstances.[269] Most military types will tell anyone who will listen that if you have the larger force use it all at one point of assault and gain absolute superiority over the foe. The Japanese plan put four carriers away from the main action at Midway. Two large carriers sailing with an invasion fleet to Port Moresby planned to return in time for the Midway action, but why take them so far away, and put them at risk, so near the date of the big show? These carriers failed to join the action at Midway, and this reduction of striking power haunted the Japanese fleet at the battle.

Yamamoto’s plans began to go wrong quickly. At the Battle of the Coral Sea on May 4 through 8, 1942, only pilots from the aircraft carriers saw the other fleet. For the first time in history two fleets fought it out never coming in sight of one another. When it was over, the US Navy lost the heavy fleet carrier Lexington and the Japanese lost a light carrier (Soho). In addition, the US Fleet carrier Yorktown suffered extensive damage. The loss of the Lexington was a hefty blow to the US Navy. On the surface, it seemed the Japanese won another victory; however, two Japanese fleet carriers Shôkaku and Zuikaku lost a large number of aircraft and pilots, plus they suffered battle damage and returned to Japan for repair and replenishment of pilots and aircraft. Thus, two fleet carriers were lost to the Midway operation and the Japanese invasion fleet turned back, thereby failing to invade Port Moresby. The Battle of the Coral Sea was the first strategic defeat for the Japanese navy.

The Japanese may have wondered why two US aircraft carriers happened to be hanging around the Coral Sea at that particular moment in time. It was not bad luck. The code breakers at Pearl Harbor’s station Hypo deciphered parts of a key Japanese code and through brilliant analysis unscrambled Yamamoto’s plan. Admiral Nimitz, now in charge of the US Pacific Fleet, had trusted his code breaking genius, Commander Rochqfort, and sent his carriers to intercept the Port Moresby invasion fleet. He would trust this same man and his team’s analysis again when they declared that Japan’s next objective was the tiny island of Midway. Nimitz sent ALL three of his available carriers to fight the Japanese fleet at Midway. By holding zero back Nimitz took a huge risk with his last and best naval units. Literally everything would ride on their performance and luck.

The Battle of Midway

June 4 to June 6, 1942

Many historians consider the Battle of Midway as the turning point of the Pacific War, and one of the most important naval battles of all time. It is a complex battle where decisions by Nagumo (same admiral who led the Pearl Harbor attack), and persistent bad luck doomed all four fleet carriers of the Japanese strike force. Instead of ambushing the Americans and sinking their carrier fleet, the opposite occurred. For the US Navy and its three available carriers the Battle of Midway was an immense gamble. Battle damage to the USS Yorktown at the Battle of the Coral Sea, and six month repair estimates, only added to the risk. Nimitz ordered the repairs done in three days. American