The Super Summary of World History - Alan Dale Daniel [208]
On the night of 8 August 1942, the US Navy and its Allies suffered a signal defeat at the hands of a Japanese cruiser force commanded by Vice-Admiral Mikawa off Savo Island. The Japanese skillfully avoided two Allied picket destroyers, completely surprising several Allied cruisers. Four Allied cruisers were sunk (one Australian, three American), plus one cruiser and two destroyers were damaged. 1,270 Allied sailors died, and 790 wounded.[279] The Japanese suffered light damage on three of its cruisers and about fifty killed. The Japanese force was set to destroy the still loaded transports and the supplies stacked high on the beach when, mysteriously, Vice Admiral Mikawa withdrew as he was on the verge of total victory. Why he failed to bombard the unprotected transports is a hard question. Admiral Mikawa stated aircraft could attack his ships at first light unless he got out of flight range. The decision was a tide-turning event. If he sank the supply transports and bombarded the supply stacked beaches a swift withdrawal would have been the only choice for the Americans. To protect seven cruisers Vice-Admiral Mikawa sacrificed an early and decisive win at Guadalcanal.
Some people reading about naval warfare erroneously think warships are the key to victory. The king of the seas is the transport—the lowly supply ship—that trundles along without glory or much of anything else. The carrier may be the queen of the seas and all the other warships the royal entourage; however, they all exist to get the cargo ship to its destination quickly and safely. That is why the Germans knew they could win the war with England if they could sink enough transports. All the battleships, cruisers, destroyers, and carriers in the English naval inventory would mean nothing if the transports were sunk. Who can eat a battleship? Do the soldiers, no matter how brave and resourceful, stand a chance without bullets? As Japan found out on Guadalcanal, troops who are starving to the point of death seldom attack enemy positions acceptably.
Recall that the US code breakers were unable to read Japan’s codes for months because of cipher changes after Midway; however, the United States did have a unique source of intelligence during the Solomon campaign, the Australian Coast Watchers. Hiding in the jungle with radios they transmitted vital information to the Americans on Guadalcanal. To illustrate; if US Marine pilots knew early enough Japanese air attacks were on the way they could scramble their Wildcat fighters and climb above the incoming raiders, then dive down on them as they approached the island. This tactic inflicted additional Japanese losses because the Wildcat performed best in a dive. Failure to warn the Wildcats soon enough would mean much higher US losses. Without the Coast Watchers every Japanese raid would be a near surprise.
The numbers of naval and air assets favored Japan at the start. Because of the threat of continued Japanese assaults on the transports, Admiral Turner, in overall charge of the Guadalcanal operation, decided to withdraw the navy along with the precious transports that were still partially loaded. His decision left the marines in the lurch without sufficient supplies, ammunition, or equipment. For months the US Navy opted for small convoys delivering just enough ammunition and food to Guadalcanal for the troops and airmen to carry on.[280] Somehow, with a minimum of supplies and support, the US Marines and US Army held on halting several Japanese assaults on Henderson Field’s perimeter. If Japan’s troops broke through and took the airfield it would be over for the invaders. Henderson Field was the key to the campaign.
Both navies began to understand that controlling the Slot was vital to winning the island contest. As a result, a number of naval battles took place around the Solomon Islands deciding the fate of the marines and army troops on Guadalcanal every bit as much as the ground fighting.