The Super Summary of World History - Alan Dale Daniel [210]
By mismanagement on a scale beyond comprehension Japan and Germany turned conquered peoples against them, failing to obtain a good return on the raw materials and physical assets they captured. The Axis planned for wars of conquest, but they failed to effectively plan for the well-organized use of their conquered resources during the war. They assumed that once these assets were seized they would simply do what they wanted with them (including the people). To their consternation people resisted murderous oppression and raw materials failed to simply up and move themselves to factories in the homeland. The skilled workers who knew how to extract the raw materials often ran away to avoid the oppressors. Those staying were enslaved, so they worked slow and made many “mistakes.”
A key element in this lack of resource management was failing to convince conquered peoples to join the fight against the Allies (especially the Russians). There were exceptions, but as a rule, people “liberated” by the Japanese and Germans found them harsh taskmasters. As a result, they came to resent their Axis overseers and refused to serve as their soldiers. Compare this result to the communist Chinese who recruited the central government’s own people to fight for them in China’s civil war. Had the Axis consistently convinced even a small percentage to join their camp a lot could have changed. This failure by the Axis to show proper concern for people falling under their sway was central to their loss of WWII. It seems no single decision drove this course of action. This was just collective stupidity on an extraordinary scale.
Hitler Attacks in the East
1942
( . . . or What’s in a name?)
In the summer of 1942 Hitler began operations to capture large amounts of land and resources south of Moscow. In this region there were ample supplies of oil, grain, and raw materials that could help the Nazi war machine. The attack’s direction surprised the Soviets and initially allowed the Germans to make good ground. Note that Stalingrad was NOT originally a major target of the advance.
As the German offensive wore on the front expanded. It was like going up a funnel rather than down; thus, German units became widely separated. Non-German units began to move into the line to fill the voids left by the expansion of the front. German units were superior to Italian, Romanian, and other friendly Axis forces in the quality of their equipment and training. Even in static defense non-German units could not repel a strong Soviet attack. As the Germans moved into Stalingrad the Soviets began reinforcing the city. If the Germans had moved swiftly the city would have fallen early, but hesitation resulted in disaster. As at Leningrad, the failure to take Stalingrad in a timely manner had dire unforeseen consequences. At Leningrad the result was a long siege where the Soviets retained the city. At Stalingrad the results were crippling German losses of men and material.
Figure 61 German Summer Offensive 1942
Before the battle at Stalingrad began the German general staff recommended bypassing the city, but Hitler thought he must conquer the city named after his archenemy. In making this irrational decision, Hitler condemned his forces to the type of battle every German general wanted to avoid. The entire point of the German Blitzkrieg was maneuver, that is, avoid the WWI style clash of attrition. Fighting in Stalingrad was committing the German Army to the wrong type of fight. Moreover, Hitler ordered his Sixth Army into a head-on clash against a Soviet army outnumbering his troops and fighting on smashed city terrain ideal for defense. Worse, the Soviets were receiving ample supplies and reinforcements. Worse yet, on the flanks of Stalingrad non-German units were in place because of a lack of Nazi