• Choose a category
• All
• Classic-Fiction

Germany fared poorly in spite of great efforts. Effective code breaking, anti-submarine technology, convoys, and new fighting methods ended Germany’s chance of an undersea victory in 1943. Ultra and the defective German torpedoes were key elements in their downfall, along with the Allied decision at Casablanca to defeat the U-boat threat first.[303] The Japanese constructed excellent long-range submarines and possessed the best torpedo of any combatant. In spite of these wonderful weapons, Japanese tactical doctrine on how to use submarines failed them. Based on their ancient warrior’s code, enemy soldiers were the main targets of attack, not supply lines. As such, the Japanese totally misused their submarines by confining them to attacking warships instead of cargo ships. If the Japanese had placed a number of submarines between Hawaii and the US West Coast and attacked Allied cargo ships, they could have significantly hampered Allied operations in the Pacific.

Hammering Toward Victory—Europe

1944-1945

D-Day and Beyond

Never, never, never believe any war will be smooth and easy, or that anyone who embarks on the strange voyage can measure the tides and hurricanes he will encounter. The statesman who yields to war fever must realize that once the signal is given, he is no longer the master of policy but the slave of unforeseeable and uncontrollable events.

—Sir Winston Churchill

Background to D-Day

Stalin kept pressing the Allies for a second front. Easy for Stalin to demand, but an invasion of Nazi occupied Europe was going to be a huge, costly, and risky undertaking. Yet it had to be done. A failure to invade France had the potential of leaving all of Europe in Soviet hands after the war. England and America realized the Soviets were gaining strength and would defeat Hitler. The only issue was the cost of victory. On the other hand, if the D-Day invasion were a failure, or if the Allies refused to invade, Stalin might choose to quit if Hitler offered a good-enough deal. If that were to occur, two mass murderers could rule Europe for decades.

The English, led by Churchill, wanted to put off the invasion until 1945 and continue to raid the periphery of the Third Reich. This strategy of waiting and raiding served the British well for hundreds of years. It worked against Napoleon of France, Philip of Spain, and others. In World War I, the British committed their army to the continent, and the cost was horrendous. The British now returned to the ancient formula and thought by using their control of the sea and raiding ability they could hurt Hitler’s forces and save their own for the final blow—when the “right” time arrived. The Soviets saw this as stalling, and constituted attempts by capitalist powers to bleed both Hitler and the Soviets white, then step in and claim all of Europe for their spoils.[304]

America had a different history and experience with war. The American Civil War formulated the ideas of war in the American military mind. Like Grant during the Civil War, the United States wanted to go straight at the enemy and destroy him as quickly as possible. US Generals disliked the periphery strategy of hitting the enemy here and there while waiting for the decisive moment to engage. The United States wanted to go ashore in France and have it out with the Nazis. They did not care to let the Nazis and Soviets kill each other off for a year or two before proceeding into France. In essence, the US wanted to win and go home.

Churchill could not fathom the American interest in an immediate sea assault on Nazi-occupied France. He knew casualties would be high, and the risk of a total defeat on the beaches was ever present. American generals could not understand England’s reluctance to hit the Nazis and drive them into oblivion. America had great confidence in its ability to destroy the Nazi army, but the British were more cautious. England was driven to near defeat in 1918, chased off the continent in 1940, and mauled in a large raid on the