The Super Summary of World History - Alan Dale Daniel [261]
History has a way of bringing irrational hopes to an end rather quickly. The A-bomb was not going to end wars where it was not used, and the A-bomb did not end the need for ground troops or naval units. After the Soviets developed their own A-bomb, new worries about a nuclear war popped up to further dilute the concept that the atomic bomb had ended conventional wars. If no one could use the bomb then wars would go on. After all, who would risk the destruction of the world over a place like Korea? The Western Democracies had cut their militaries too much, and now their soldiers, sailors, and marines were going to pay the piper for the shortsighted decisions of their leaders (again, just like WWII).
General MacArthur had been put in charge of the UN forces after the invasion, and he hatched a brilliant but risky plan to change the course of the conflict.
The fighting around Pusan was as hard as any in history. General MacArthur realized trying to attack up the Korean peninsula from Pusan would be World War I all over again. A frontal assault on a numerically superior dug-in enemy in mountainous terrain would be costly, and winter was on the way. Take too much time moving north and the harsh Korean winter and rough terrain would make offensive action daunting. By using the amphibious ability of the US Navy and Marine Corps (or what was left of it), General MacArthur thought he could dramatically change the course of the war with a landing behind the enemy lines about half way up the west Korean coast near Seoul, the nation’s capital. The US Joint Chiefs of Staff thought the plan too risky and wanted to land farther south; however, MacArthur pointed out such a landing would accomplish little. By landing at Inchon near Seoul the Allies could deal the invaders a lethal blow and force a North Korean retreat without attacking at Pusan. President Truman sided with MacArthur, and the invasion was on. Both the Joint Chiefs and the president had missed one critical point in MacArthur’s plan. He clearly said that after the capture of Seoul the troops would move north. This aspect of his plan should have been thoroughly discussed, however, because of the focus on the risk of landing at Inchon the other major risk—moving north of the thirty-eighth parallel—was ignored.
Inchon The UN Allies Strike Back
September 15, 1950
Far up the west side of the mountainous Korean peninsula was a port just to the west of Seoul. The port was Inchon, a very unusual place. The harbor’s tides were very high and mud flats appeared for hours every day when the tide went out, and these mud flats prevented ship movement. As the tide came back to cover the mud flats ships could once more move up Flying Fish Channel. MacArthur wanted to go ashore there and drive east to Seoul. Seoul was the road and rail junction for everything going south; thus, control of Seoul equaled control of all supplies trying to move south. Acute obstacles faced an amphibious assault at Inchon, and one severe problem was the condition of the once-mighty amphibious arm of the US Navy. Most of the assault craft and naval gunfire support ships were gone, and those that remained were in poor shape. Nonetheless, the navy and marines thought they could do it.
MacArthur’s plan was brilliant. Risky as it was, if it worked the achievement would be colossal. The war could be won in a month rather than years. The communist army to the south would be cut off by the invasion and then destroyed by an attack