The Theory of Moral Sentiments - Adam Smith [257]
7 In speaking of the “illusions of the imagination” here and in 3.2 and 4.1, Smith may have Hume in mind; see, e.g., Treatise 1.3.5.4, 1.4.2.29, 1.4.7.6.
8 In 7.3.1 (p. 371), Smith names Hobbes, Pufendorf, and Mandeville as self-love theorists and refers to their various teachings on sociability and dependence.
9 spleen: “anger; spite; ill-humour” or “melancholy; hypochondriacal vapours” (Johnson).
10 For explication, see Smith’s review of Hutcheson and Hume at 7.2.3 (p. 353).
11 On the intellectual sentiments of admiration, wonder, and surprise, see esp. Smith’s History of Astronomy 1-2; for commentary, see Eric Schliesser in British Journal for the History of Philosophy 13 (2005).
12 Smith’s response to this position is further developed in 4.2 (p. 218).
13 Smith’s distinction between the amiable and the awful virtues is anticipated by several others; see, e.g., Hume, Treatise 3.3.4.2 and Enquiry Concerning Morals App. 4.6; Burke, Philosophical Enquiry 3.10. The distinction plays a principal role in his thought and that of other main figures of the Scottish Enlightenment insofar as the distinction between the awful and amiable virtues represented more generally a distinction between the demanding virtues revered by classical antiquity and savage societies and the more polite and gentle virtues of commercial modernity. This theme reappears in remarks on savagery (5.2), human excellence (6), and Stoicism (7.2.1); a key discussion of Smith’s immediate context is Hume, Enquiry Concerning Morals 7.11-18.
14 Matthew 22:36-40; Mark 12:30-31; John 13:34-35; 1 Corinthians 13:13; see also 3.6 (p. 197).
15 Smith’s distinction between propriety and virtue is fundamental to his thought as it both distinguishes the subjects of Part 1 from those of Part 6 and anticipates his distinction between the ordinary objects of praise, and the noble and honorable actions associated with praiseworthiness (3.2). In distinguishing mere propriety from true virtue, Smith may have in mind the distinction of decorum (propriety) and honestum (honorable and noble) fundamental to Cicero (see, e.g., De officiis 1.93-95), and revived in the Scottish Enlightenment in part via Hutcheson’s reminder of the difference between the ordinary duties described in Cicero’s De officiis and the supreme goods examined in his De finibus (Short Introduction Preface). Smith explicitly invokes the concept of offices on other occasions (e.g. 2.1.2, 7.2.1).
16 Smith returns to this point in his discussion of the wise and virtuous man at 6.3 (p. 280); see also Cicero, De officiis 3.15.
PART I , SECTION II
1 Among ancient treatments, see, e.g., Aristotle, Politics 1.2, 1252a25-1253a25; Epictetus, Discourses 1.3.3, 1.6.12-22; Marcus Aurelius, Meditations 3.16, 6.23; Cicero, De officiis 1.105-7. The comparison of animal to human nature was a prominent theme in Descartes, Locke, and Malebranche; in Smith’s more immediate context, see, e.g., Hume, Treatise 2.1.12 and 2.2.12; Rousseau, Discourse on Inequality 1.
2 See 1.1.1 above.
3 In his Philoctetes, Sophocles recounts Philoctetes’ laments at the injustice of his abandonment and his physical suffering (l. 732- 821). Sophocles’ Trachinian Women recounts Heracles’ pain following his wife’s inadvertent poisoning and his plea to his son to put him out of his misery (l. 749-812, 971-1278). In Hippolytus, Euripides portrays the suffering and death of Hippolytus after having been dragged by his horses (l. 1173-1254, 1347-1466).
4 See 1.1.4 (p. 25).
5 raillery: “slight satire; satirical merriment” (Johnson).
6 For Tibullus’ praises of tranquil country life, see, e.g., 1.1, 1.5, 2.1; for his critique of the pursuit of wealth as inimical to tranquility, see, e.g., 1.1, 1.9, 1.10, 2.2. His poetry was often bound with that of his contemporary Propertius (as in the 1753 edition published in Glasgow owned by Smith); Smith’s