The Theory of Moral Sentiments - Adam Smith [260]
4 See, e.g., Leviticus 24:19.
5 That our primary regard is to ourselves rather than to others (which is also Smith’s point of departure in Part 6) was commonly accepted by all parties to the debate over self-love and benevolence. In antiquity it was shared by both Stoics and Epicureans among others (see Cicero, De finibus 5.24-30; De officiis 1.11); in the Enlightenment the primacy of the concern for self-preservation is reiterated by such prominent advocates of benevolence as Shaftesbury (Inquiry Concerning Virtue 1.2.2) and Hutcheson (Short Introduction 1.6.3).
6 Smith uses this location on three separate occasions in TMS; see his accounts of the earthquake in China in 3.3 (p. 156), and of patriotism in 6.2.2 (p. 268).
7 Smith borrows the race metaphor from Cicero (see De officiis 3.42), perhaps as reported by Pufendorf (see Of the Law of Nature and Nations 2.3.16n).
8 On the anguish of remorse, see esp. Hutcheson, Essay with Illustrations 1.5.5 and Short Introduction 1.2.9; and Kames, Essays on Morality and Religion 1.2.3 and 1.3.
9 Smith here intervenes in an ancient debate over the question of whether human beings are by nature self-sufficient or dependent on others—a prominent theme in Marcus Aurelius (see, e.g., Meditations 2.1, 5.16, 8.59) and Cicero (see, e.g., De officiis 1.22, 2.15), and revived by both Rousseau in his Discourse on Inequality and the thinkers reviewed in 7.2-3 in their debates over self-love and benevolence. Smith’s own understanding of human interdependence is central to his political economy; see esp. Wealth of Nations 1.1-2.
10 See, e.g., Hume, Enquiry Concerning Morals 4.15.
11 Here and in 2.3.3 (p. 125) Smith invokes the doctrine of “final causes” originally associated with Aristotelian teleology, which referred to the end or purpose (telos) specific to a given action or organism. In the Scottish Enlightenment the debate over final causes ranged from those who incorporated final causes into their providentialist conceptions of cosmology and ethics (such as Hutcheson) to those skeptical of our capacity to apprehend such ends (such as Hume). For commentary, see Alvey.
12 Smith’s account of our approbation of the punishment of injustice (mirrored in his account at Jurisprudence A 2.90ff) refers principally to the theories of punishment developed by those he associates with natural sociability (esp. Grotius, Pufendorf, and Hutcheson). For their views on natural sociability, see the notes to 7.3 (p. 485); for their theories of punishment (including capital punishment), see Grotius, Rights of War and Peace 2.20.1- 9; Pufendorf, Law of Nature and Nations 8.3.1-12 and Duty of Man and Citizen 2.13; Hutcheson, Short Introduction 3.8.9-10 and System 3.9.10-15. On the general claim concerning the indispensability of justice to the preservation of society, see esp. Hobbes, Leviathan 15; and Hume, Enquiry Concerning Morals 4.
13 See Polybius 6.36-37.
14 This final sentence was an addition to the sixth edition, replacing a longer passage on the relationship of humanity to divinity. Smith’s study of the wise and virtuous man in 6.3 (p. 280) also treats this theme. More broadly, Smith’s argument in 2.2.3 is an intervention in the debate over the relationship of a belief in the afterlife to justice (e.g., Plato, Republic 10, 613b-621d; Rousseau, The Social Contract 4.8), revived in terms anticipating Smith by Hutcheson (e.g. Essay With Illustrations 1.6.4). Smith returns to this question, see esp. 3.5, 6.2.3.
PART II , SECTION III
1 The Dryads were ancient Greek tree nymphs, and the Lares ancient Roman household gods responsible for protecting households and localities.
2 The punishment of the ox is drawn from Exodus