The Theory of Moral Sentiments - Adam Smith [269]
14 See, e.g., Nicomachean Ethics 1.7, 1097b34-1098a20.
15 Smith here cites the Magna Moralia, whose attribution to Aristotle is now largely thought spurious. Magna Moralia 1.1, 1182a15-23 argues that Socrates overlooked the place of the irrational; 1183b9-18 argues more explicitly that the Socratic science of virtue overlooks activity. See also Aristotle’s response to Socrates in Nicomachean Ethics 7.2, 1145b22-1146a8, as well as Smith’s own insistence in 2.3 that “Man was made for action.”
16 None of Zeno’s writings have survived; Smith accordingly relies on the accounts of Zeno given in Cicero, De finibus 3 and Diogenes Laertius 7.
17 See, e.g., Cicero, De finibus 3.16, 3.59; Diogenes Laertius 7.85.
18 Cicero and Diogenes present Zeno and the Stoics as distinguishing the absolute good of moral worth—to kalon in Greek or honestum in Latin—from the lower class of objects (including health, wealth, and reputation) whose possession is preferable and whose opposites (including sickness, poverty, and ignominy) are undesirable, but which appear insignificant or indifferent when compared to virtue. See, e.g., Cicero, De finibus 3.10-11, 3.20 -21, 3.43-46, 3.48-51, 3.56; and Diogenes Laertius 7.102, 7.106, 7.108.
19 For the Stoic understanding of propriety in choosing and rejecting and its relationship to living according to nature, see, e.g., Cicero, and its relationship to living according to nature, see, e.g., Cicero, De finibus 2.34, 3.20, 3.26, 3.31, 4.15; Diogenes Laertius 7.87. The idea of “living according to nature” is esp. prominent in Mar-The idea of “living according to nature” is esp. prominent in Marcus Aurelius (e.g., Meditations 1.17, 3.12, 5.3-4, 7.55-59, 10.15; see also Epictetus, Discourses 1.26.1-2) and central to the Scottish Enlightenment; see, e.g., Hutcheson, Essay with Illustrations 1.6.7; Kames, Essays on Morality and Religion 1.2.1.
20 The relationship of the doctrines of the Stoics to those of the Peripatetics is a principal concern of Cicero; see, e.g., De finibus 3.41.
21 On the “primary objects” recommended by nature, see Smith’s note at 7.2.2 (p. 346) and the accompanying editor’s note.
22 For the Stoic conception of providence and its direction of the universe, see, e.g., Epictetus, Discourses 1.6, 1.14, 1.16; Marcus Aurelius, Meditations 2.3, 6.36-39, 7.9.
23 See Epictetus, Discourses 2.5.24-26.
24 This and the three following paragraphs are a heavily revised version of Smith’s treatment of Stoicism in Part 1 in editions prior to the sixth edition of 1790.
25 Smith here likely has in mind the line from the 1st c. AD Roman philosopher Demetrius the Cynic, as reported by his friend the Stoic philosopher Seneca, in De providentia 5.5.
26 See Epictetus, Discourses 2.5.10-14. On the individual’s obligation to understand himself as part of the whole, see esp. Marcus Aurelius, Meditations 2.4, 2.9, 7.13, 8.34, 11.8.
27 In addition to the passage cited above, see also Epictetus, Discourses 1.25.1, 2.2.15-20, 2.5.1-5. For Smith’s own very different view, see 2.3 (p. 111).
28 For the Stoic conception of gratitude for our enemies and our challenges, see, e.g., Seneca, De providentia 3.1-4, 4.4-8.
29 The remainder of this section was an addition to the sixth edition of 1790.
30 For the Stoic metaphor on life as a game, see, e.g., Epictetus, Discourses 2.5.15-17.
31 See Epictetus, Discourses 1.25.18-21.
32 The Stoics have long been understood as advocates of suicide. For more moderate views of the Stoic conception, see, e.g., Cicero, De finibus 3.60-61; Diogenes Laertius 7.130.
33 See Epictetus, Discourses 1.25.14-17.
34 See Cicero, De finibus 3.60.
35 For the Stoic views on bearing misfortune with constancy, see, e.g., Seneca, De constantia sapientis