The Theory of Moral Sentiments - Adam Smith [272]
77 phasis: “appearance exhibited by any body; as the changes of the moon” (Johnson).
78 A free rendering of Xenophon, Memorabilia 1.7; Smith’s quotation marks seem to indicate this as a speech of Socrates rather than a direct transcription of the source text. See also Cicero’s similar discussion of “true glory” in De officiis 2.43.
79 On Epicurus’s metaphysical doctrines and their debts to atomism, see, e.g., Diogenes Laertius 10.39f.
80 Hutcheson and Hume had both previously criticized self-love theorists on similar grounds; see, e.g., Hutcheson, Essay with Illustrations 1. Preface, and Hume, Enquiry Concerning Morals App. 2.6. Elsewhere Smith describes the utility of such an approach in natural philosophy; see, e.g., History of Astronomy 2.12.
81 Literally “the things primary by nature.” In Stoicism these included the necessaries of the body essential to preservation and physical well-being, but rigorously distinguished these from that which was in itself genuinely good or honorable (honestum); see, e.g., Cicero, De finibus 3.21.
82 See Smith’s similarly worded account given in his own name in the closing paragraphs of 2.3.3 (p. 103).
83 Smith here refers to the school of Alexandrian thinkers from Potamon to Iamblichus who flourished between the reign of Augustus and the fall of Rome, were united in receptivity to Platonism and hostility to Epicureanism, and were often receptive to Christianity. Smith’s likely sources include Diderot’s essay “Eclectisme” in the Encyclopédie (which emphasizes efforts to imitate God through contemplation, and the wise man’s duty to promote the well-being of others); Part II, Chapter 1 of the study of the 2nd c. AD in Mosheim, Ecclesiastical History (1726) (which especially emphasizes that the aim of Eclecticism is direct communication with God); and Hutcheson’s comment on the Eclectics at the conclusion of his “Dissertation on the Origin of Philosophy” (1756).
84 Together the “Cambridge Platonists,” collectively united by a suspicion of the materialist metaphysics of Descartes, Spinoza, and Hobbes, and a commitment to reconciling Platonic reason with Christian revelation. For their teachings on divine love, see, e.g., More, An Essay on Disinterested Love (Glasgow, 1756); and John Smith, Select Discourses 5.2-4.
85 On the double sympathy that recommends benevolence and its amiable weaknesses, see esp. 1.2.4 (p. 48).
86 Hutcheson’s discussions of benevolence include Inquiry into Beauty and Virtue 2.2-3, on which several of Smith’s discrete observations that follow depend.
87 Here and below Smith regards Hutcheson as a hard-line moral rigorist. As Smith notes, Hutcheson in various places suggests that self-interested motives can lessen moral merit; see, e.g., Inquiry into Beauty and Virtue 2.2.3; Short Introduction 2.3.6; and System 2.2.1. But elsewhere, Hutcheson’s views are somewhat more moderate; see, e.g., Inquiry into Beauty and Virtue 2.3.5 (which presents the view of self-love as “indifferent” to which Smith refers) and Essay with Illustrations 2.4, as well as his discussions of the “sense of honor” (Short Introduction 1.1.13 and 1.2.8; and System 1.2.6 and 1.5).
88 On public good as a universal standard, see, e.g., Inquiry into Beauty and Virtue 2.3.3, in which Hutcheson references the “late debates about passive obedience, and the right of resistance” instigated by Berkeley’s Passive Obedience (1712); see also Hume’s intervention in “Of Passive Obedience.”
89 For Hutcheson’s equations of virtue with degrees of benevolence, see Inquiry into Beauty and Virtue 2.3.8; Short Introduction 1.1.11, 1.3.1; System 1.4.10.
90 The similarity between this locution and Smith’s use of the phrase “one of the multitude” on three occasions in TMS (2.2.2 and note above) suggests the influence of Hutcheson.
91 Smith’s references are to Inquiry