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The Theory of Moral Sentiments - Adam Smith [280]

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and utility of action; and virtue

self-interest: and authority of conscience; and beneficence; and duty; and human nature; and Hutcheson; and justice; and perception of virtue; and prudence; and the public good; selfish passions; self-love; and Stoicism; and survival instinct; and vanity

Seneca

Shaftesbury, Anthony Ashley Cooper, first Earl of

Shaftesbury, Anthony Ashley Cooper, third Earl of

Sidney, Algernon

Sidney, Sir Philip

Simson, Robert

Smith, John

sociability

social order: and ambition; and beneficence; and corruption of moral sentiments; and fashion; and natural jurisprudence; and punishment; and selfish passions; and virtue; and wealth

social status. See ranks (social status)

Socrates

Solon

Sophocles

St. Bartholomew’s Day Massacre

statesmanship

Stewart, Matthew

Stoicism; and divine order; and ends of life; and Epicureanism; and fortune; and happiness; and human nature; and licentiousness; maxims of; and misfortune; and moral worth; and natural desire; paradoxes of; and propriety; and self-command; and self-interest, command; and self-interest; and suicide

suffering

suicide: and Aristomenes; and Cato; Hume on; and praiseworthiness; and Stoicism

Sully, Maximilien de Béthune, Duc de

Sulpitius

Swift, Jonathan

sympathy: and approbation; and authority of conscience; and beneficence; described; and family structure; and gratitude; limits of; and love; and moral sense; mutual sense of; and physical passions; and propriety of passions; and resentment; and self-command; and selfish passions; and self-love; Smith’s use of; and social customs; and social passions; and social status; and sorrow and joy; and universal benevolence; and unsocial passions; and utility

Tacitus

Tamerlane

taste

temperance. See also self-command: and amiable passions; Aristotle on; and Epicureanism; Mandeville on; and Platonic virtue; and pleasure; and prudence; and social rank; and Stoicism; and utility

Themistocles

Theramenes

Tibullus

Tigranes II

Timolean

torture

Turenne, Henri de La Tour d’Auvergne, Vicomte de

unsocial passions

utility

vanity: and esteem; and fashion; Mandeville on; and praiseworthiness; and self-command; and self-interest; and social status

vengeance: and atonement; divine; and justice; and pity; and punishment; and resentment; and self-command

Vertue, George

Vespasian

vices

virtue: amiable virtues; and approbation; Aristotelian system of; and benevolence; cardinal virtues; and corruption of moral sentiments; and customs; and duty; and friendships; imperfect virtues; and individual character; and kinship ties; and licentiousness; Mandeville on; and modern philosophical systems; Platonic system of; and praiseworthiness; and propriety; and prudence; and reason; and relativism; and rules of morality; and self-command; and self-interest; and social order; and social status; Socratic system of; and Stoicism; and systems of moral sentiments; and unsocial passions; and utility

Voltaire

war: civil wars; Grotius on; and justice; laws of; and public spirit; and self-command; and state of nature

wealth

William III, of England

Wollaston, William

Zeno of Citium

a

I am most grateful to Kirsty Walker for helping me with the textual research for this introduction.

b

It has been objected to me that as I found the sentiment of approbation, which is always agreeable, upon sympathy, it is inconsistent with my system to admit any disagreeable sympathy. I answer, that in the sentiment of approbation there are two things to be taken notice of; first, the sympathetic passion of the spectator; and, secondly, the emotion which arises from his observing the perfect coincidence between this sympathetic passion in himself, and the original passion in the person principally concerned. This last emotion, in which the sentiment of approbation properly consists, is always agreeable and delightful. The other may either be agreeable or disagreeable, according to the nature of the original passion, whose features it must always, in some measure, retain.2

c

To ascribe in this manner our natural sense

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