The Three Christs of Ypsilanti - Milton Rokeach [17]
We can get at least a hint of what might happen under such prolonged experiences by considering some recent reports on “thought reform,” “brainwashing,” and voluntary confession.[11] Robert Lifton, a psychiatrist who studied a number of Westerners following their release from Chinese prisons, reports that one of his subjects was addressed, while in prison, by number rather than name. The “undermining of identity is the stroke through which the prisoner ‘dies to the world,’ the prerequisite for all that follows.”[12] And again: “Belief and identity are so intimately related that any change in one must affect the other.”[13] It would seem that under such conditions as isolation, absolute control of information from the outside world, and the removal of the usual group supports, there would be a loss of ego and group identity, and that, with the substitution of new group supports, the way would be paved for the emergence of new identities, changes in ideology, voluntary confession, and collaboration. But it is difficult to pin down the exact conditions which led to changes in some prisoners and not in others, and to gauge the exact changes actually effected in those who did change. Physical hardship and duress were often present, and the methods of control varied from time to time, from prison to prison, and from prisoner to prisoner. Differences in the personality, status, and education of the prisoners were also unknown variables.
Social scientists cannot, for ethical reasons, conduct “thought control” experiments or violate primitive beliefs in children or even in adults for prolonged periods. It is necessary to find other ways to explore the conditions which lead to changes in systems of belief and in behavior, and to explore what happens when primitive beliefs are violated for longer periods. The identity of the person must not be endangered and the effects should be constructive rather than destructive.
Consider, therefore, a converse situation. Suppose that the primitive belief to be violated is one that has no social support instead of one that has unanimous social support. This would be the case for a psychotic with a mistaken belief in his identity. Suppose we brought together two or more persons claiming the same mistaken identity?
In delusional systems of belief, the primitive belief in one’s identity (or, for that matter, any other delusional belief) cannot effectively be contradicted by another person because the deluded person will accept no external referents or authorities. A major reason that psychoanalysts have generally avoided even attempting psychotherapy with psychotics is the enormous difficulty of establishing a transference relationship, one in which the patient is able to develop an emotional relationship with the therapist as the figure of authority. Since a deluded person will accept no external referents, how can one possibly hope to change his beliefs from the outside?
Further consideration suggests that this may not be necessary. There is a second primitive belief which is based on reality even in a psychotic with a mistaken belief about his identity: the belief that only one person can have a particular identity. In confronting the three Christs with one another, we proposed to bring into a dissonant relation two primitive beliefs within each of them: his delusional belief in his identity and his realistic belief that only one person can have a given identity. In such a situation, the locus of the conflict, if there is conflict at all, would be within each individual rather than among them.
It should be clear from the preceding account that the research with the three delusional Christs evolved as a result of a theoretical concern, not with psychopathology