The Two Koreas_ A Contemporary History - Don Oberdorfer [112]
In internal discussions regarding North Korea, "we came to the conclusion that if you're really going to achieve some sort of a semblance of peace on the Korea peninsula, the only way to do that is to take some steps to try to open the place," recalled Sigur. The Soviets and Chinese, he pointed out, had forever been pushing Washington to deal with Pyongyang. A central barrier had been Seoul's objections, and now those seemed to have lessened. That being so, the main issue at hand was one of tactics. Here Clark suggested a "modest initiative" that would be unilateral rather than conditional on North Korea's response.
In October 1988, following the successful completion of the Seoul Olympics, the State Department drew up and won White House approval for its plan, consisting of four points:
• A new policy of encouraging unofficial, nongovernmental visits by North Koreans to the United States. Since the beginning of 1988, only eight visas had been requested by North Koreans, and four of those-to attend a speed skating event in St. Louis-had been denied.
• Easing of stringent financial regulations that impeded travel to North Korea by American citizens.
• Permission for limited commercial export of American humanitarian goods, such as food, clothing, and medicine, to North Korea.
• Renewed permission for substantive discussions with North Koreans in neutral settings, with the expectation that this time serious communication might take place.
While no North Korean steps would be required to trigger these limited U.S. moves, Pyongyang would be asked for a "positive, constructive response." In private and public statements Washington listed five items that could be considered encouraging symbols of a more constructive policy. These were progress in the North-South dialogue, return of the remains of Americans missing in action from the Korean War, the elimination of anti-American propaganda, the implementation of confidence-building measures along the DMZ, and credible assurances that North Korea had abandoned terrorism as an instrument of state policy.
The American steps were discussed with Roh at the White House on October 20, when he met Reagan and Shultz during a fourday U.S. visit to address the UN General Assembly. Roh, who had been publicly appealing for a summit with Kim Il Sung and whose UN address was unusually conciliatory, approved the American initiative but asked that it not be made public until a few days after he returned to Seoul, which was done. In the meantime, U.S. diplomats briefed foreign governments on the initiative, with special attention to Soviet bloc countries in Europe, which were not usually briefed on American policies in Asia. In an October 25 cable to its embassies, the State Department emphasized that "these proposed measures are being taken both to stay in step with (but not in advance of) the ROKG in this matter, but also because we have substantial interests of our own in seeking to reduce tensions on the Korean peninsula and in promoting dialogue between the North and the South."
On October 28, three days before the public announcement, the State Department sent out instructions for special presentations of the new policies to the Soviet and Chinese governments, with the Chinese explicitly asked to pass along the briefing to Pyongyang. "The door is open for the DPRK to pursue an improvement of relations with the United States, if the DPRK abandons belligerence, confrontation and terrorism in favor of dialogue," Moscow and Beijing were told. The American briefers added that Washington hoped for a "constructive response."
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