The Two Koreas_ A Contemporary History - Don Oberdorfer [114]
In the case of Korea, the fundamental reason for the Soviet policy shift was economic. Among the documents considered in the Politburo meeting of November 10 was a glowing memorandum from Vladimir Kamentsev, deputy prime minister in charge of foreign economic ties, who shared the view earlier endorsed by the ministers of foreign trade, finance, and oil and gas industries that the dynamic economy of South Korea was "the most promising partner in the Far East." Trade with Seoul, which was still being conducted in cumbersome fashion through unofficial contacts and third countries, was climbing steadily, and eager South Korean businessmen were knocking on Moscow's doors with attractive offers of more lucrative trade and potentially even subsidies and outright aid, on condition that state-to-state relations be established. The conclusion of Kamentsev's memorandum, according to the notes of a participant in the meeting, was that "unless we undertake to normalize our relations with South Korea, we may be late."
Gorbachev announced that he agreed with Kamentsev's recommendation to move toward South Korea. There was no dissent, and the decision was made. At the same time, the Soviet leader expressed the need for caution in implementing the shift, saying that the Korean issue "should be approached in the context of our broad international interests, as well as our domestic interests." In this respect, he said it was too early to establish political relations with the South before discussing the matter with other members of the Soviet bloc. In the meantime, he decided, cultural, sports, and other ties should be opened wider. "This will come as a signal to Kim Il Sung and to the United States," Gorbachev commented.
Having decided to move in a decisive although evolutionary way, Gorbachev sought to rationalize the action by suggesting it could add to a strong wave of nationalism in South Korea and thereby provide impetus for the withdrawal of U.S. military forces there. This proved to be wildly unrealistic.
Ruling out "shock methods" with respect to Moscow's old dependency and ally in the Korean peninsula, Gorbachev suggested that Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze stop in Pyongyang during the course of a forthcoming trip to Japan to explain to the North Koreans the evolution of Soviet relations with South Korea. When Prime Minister Nikolai Ryzhkov remarked that Kim Ii Sung might refuse to see Shevardnadze to receive such a message, Gorbachev acknowledged this could happen-but in any case "we will make this gesture, and give North Korea a notice."
Nobody had any illusion that the explanation would be easily accepted. The Politburo had before it classified reports, which had arrived in code, from the Soviet Embassy in Pyongyang reporting that Gorbachev's perestroika reform was already coming under sharp criticism from Kim Il Sung's regime, which increasingly considered Gorbachev a "revisionist" departing from the true faith of MarxismLeninism. Gorbachev reacted calmly to these reports, noting that he had already experienced similar opposition in several other fraternal countries. Whatever the repercussions in North Korea, the Soviet leader was determined to change Moscow's long-standing Korea policies. He summed up the discussion by announcing, "We will firmly proceed on the way to rapprochement and establishing relations with South Korea. We are now taking this necessary decision."
THE ROOTS OF CHANGE
The ground had been prepared for Moscow's shift in policy several months earlier, by Soviet participation in the Seoul Olympics, which had dramatically altered official, journalistic, and popular attitudes toward South Korea.
Until the Gorbachev era, very little information about South Korea had appeared in the Soviet press, and nearly all of that negative. However, in the Olympic year of 1988, there were 195 stories in