The Two Koreas_ A Contemporary History - Don Oberdorfer [126]
Kim 11 Sung's interaction with the other great Asian power, Japan, was more dramatic. On September 24, as a result of contacts that had begun in the spring and accelerated after the GorbachevRoh meeting in June, a chartered Japan Air Line jet landed in Pyongyang bearing forty-four Japanese Diet members with accompanying Foreign Ministry officials, aides, and journalists-by far the most important Japanese official mission ever to visit the North. Over the next four days, the Great Leader deployed all his personal charm and diplomatic skill to negotiate an unexpected breakthrough with the country he had fought in World War II and had long treated as an unregenerate antagonist.
Japan had normalized its relations with South Korea in 1965, expressing deep regret for the "unfortunate period" of Japanese occupation from 1910 to 1945 and providing $800 million in grants and credits as compensation. In the years that followed, Japanese trade, investment, and technology had been powerful forces behind the South's rapid economic development. Allied with both countries, the United States strongly supported the South Korean rapprochement with Japan and worked to reduce subsequent threats to the relationship.
North Korea's relations with Japan had been much more tenuous. Kim 11 Sung had made modest overtures in the early 1970s, at the time of the U.S.-China opening and the initiation of the NorthSouth talks, but such a Pyongyang-Tokyo rapprochement was vehemently opposed by Seoul and given no encouragement from Washington. Unofficial contacts between the Japanese government and North Korea were carried on mainly through parliamentarians of the Japan Socialist Party. The abnormal relationship between the two countries was dramatically illustrated by the legend printed on Japanese passports, "This passport is valid for all countries and areas except North Korea (Democratic People's Republic of Korea.)"
Late in 1988, behind the scenes, Pyongyang began reconsidering its Japan policy and making cautious overtures to Tokyo. The first clear sign of Japanese receptiveness was a January 1989 Foreign Min istry statement declaring that "Japan does not maintain a hostile policy toward North Korea" and that it would be appropriate "to move positively toward improved relations" if Pyongyang so desired. The statement also expressed hope for the release of two Japanese fishermen who had been held on espionage charges by North Korea since 1983 for permitting a stowaway to leave aboard their ship.
The Diet delegation that flew into Pyongyang was unique in containing leaders of Japan's ruling Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) as well as those of the Socialists, and especially because it was headed by the most powerful figure in Japanese politics, Shin Kanemaru. The gruff 75-year-old LDP kingmaker held no formal government post but was widely considered the power behind several prime ministers, including the incumbent Toshiki Kaifu, who had provided a "party to party" letter for Kanemaru to take to Pyongyang.* Kanemaru, who had no foreign policy experience, overrode objections from the Foreign Ministry in accepting the North Korean invitation at the time he did.
On the second day of the visit, the entire Japanese delegation was put aboard a special train in Pyongyang and taken to a resort in the Myohyang Mountains, one of North Korea's great scenic spots and the site of Kim Il Sung's favorite villa. After a morning of highlevel meetings and a luncheon hosted by Kim, the delegation returned to Pyongyang-minus Kanemaru and a few aides,