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By Root 1889 0

as the IAEA presented the North Koreans with new data on the chemical "inconsistencies" and referred vaguely to "information" on the true purposes of the two suspect sites that North Korea had refused to acknowledge as nuclear facilities. Pyongyang's officials made various explanations and denials, none of which were credible to the IAEA. In early January, the agency's experts identified two possible explanations for the chemical inconsistencies: some of the fissile material that had been separated to plutonium might have come from undeclared and undetected diversions from the very small Soviet-supplied research reactor at Yongbyon, or the additional fissile material might have been diverted from the 5-megawatt indigenous reactor.

If the latter was true, U.S. intelligence agencies calculated, it was at least theoretically possible that enough plutonium could have been obtained from a full load of irradiated fuel rods to produce one or two nuclear weapons (although very substantial additional efforts, of which North Korea was not believed to be capable, would be required to make the plutonium into bombs). This was the basis for worst-case U.S. intelligence estimates and public statements during the nuclear crisis.

Eventually the focus of contention became the two suspect sites that the IAEA, on the basis of U.S. satellite photographs, had identified as unacknowledged nuclear waste sites. In late December 1992, Blix requested "visits" to clarify the nature of the sites and make tests. In January, Pyongyang responded that "a visit by officials could not be turned into an inspection" and said that inspections of nonnuclear military facilities "might jeopardize the supreme interests" of the DPRK. This was a clear reference to the escape clause in the Non-Proliferation Treaty, which permits a nation to withdraw from the treaty to avoid jeopardizing its "supreme national interests." In a telex, Blix was also asked to "take into full consideration the political and military situation over the Korean peninsula."

In response, Blix, meeting a North Korean representative in Vienna, spoke explicitly for the first time of the possible requirement of a "special inspection"-in this context, an inspection of undeclared activities over the objections of the state involved. Except for the case of Iraq, the agency had never made such a demand inspection before. The UN Security Council, meanwhile, declared itself able to take punitive action if IAEA inspection requests were ignored, saying that nuclear proliferation constitutes a threat to international peace and security. Thus North Korea was set to become the first test of the more vigorous international consensus against nuclear proliferation that had arisen in the wake of the discoveries about Iraq's nuclear program.

In preparation for the IAEA board meeting in February, at which the agency's demands on North Korea would be considered, Blix asked the United States to approve the display of the satellite photographs at the heart of the agency's demand for inspection of the two suspect sites. The remarkable high-resolution pictures had been shown to Blix and his staff, but the CIA was much less willing to display them to a board that included officials of leftist third-world countries such as Libya, Syria, and Algeria and in the presence of North Korean representatives.

The CIA bureaucracy in Washington initially rejected showing the photos, but in response to urgent requests from the State Department, outgoing CIA director Robert Gates overruled his staff. Thirty years earlier, intelligence photos taken by a U-2 spy plane over Cuba had startled the world when they had been publicly displayed in the UN Security Council by the Kennedy administration during the Cuban missile crisis. In the meantime, orbiting satellites and highresolution cameras had made further remarkable advances, placing every spot on earth within range of prying American eyes. Although the CIA was reluctant to advertise its prowess, Gates knew that sensitive intelligence photos had been displayed for the Security