The Two Koreas_ A Contemporary History - Don Oberdorfer [160]
Two weeks after the announcement, Han traveled to Washington with the sketchy outlines of what he called a "stick and carrot" approach to persuading Pyongyang to change its mind during the ninety-day waiting period before its withdrawal would become effective. As Han saw it, the stick would be supplied by potential UN Security Council sanctions. Under chapter 7 of the UN Charter, which had been invoked after the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, these sanctions could range from downgrading or severance of diplomatic relations to economic embargoes or military action. The carrots could include cancellation of the Team Spirit military exercise, security guarantees, trade, and other inducements to cooperate with the international community. "Pressure alone will not work," Han declared.
Han's approach was in line with the thinking of most officials in the State Department, whose business and tradition is to negotiate, but it was controversial among the more hawkish elements in Seoul and many sectors of the U.S. government. "The [U.S.] Joint Chiefs of Staff said, `Under no circumstances should you engage [the North Koreans] in negotiations. You should not reward them. You should punish them,' " recalled a State Department official. But the official added, "As soon as you said, `How do you mean, punish them?' of course the JCS would back away from any military options."
The absence of acceptable military options was also evident in Seoul. A few weeks after the North Korean announcement, when U.S. defense secretary Les Aspin made his first official visit to the ROK capital, Defense Minister Kwon Yong Hae warned that even a "surgical strike" against the Yongbyon reactor would lead to a major escalation of hostilities on the peninsula. The result, Kwon said, could be a general war that would wreak death and destruction on South Korea and immediately involve the military forces of the United States. Such an attack, even if completely successful, would probably not destroy any plutonium that might already be hidden away in North Korea.
Negotiations quickly emerged as the consensus solution in Washington, not because they appeared to be promising but because nobody could come up with another feasible plan to head off a crisis in Northeast Asia. However, talks with the North Koreans were highly controversial. With no strong signals coming from Clinton, the administration seemed unable to make a clear-cut decision to offer negotiations.
China, which was widely recognized as a crucial participant in the international maneuvering, was urging direct negotiations between the United States and North Korea, which were ardently desired by Pyongyang. South Korean Foreign Minister Han, in a meeting with Chinese Foreign Minister Qian Qichen in Bangkok on April 22, said Seoul would drop its long-standing opposition to Washington-Pyongyang talks if China, in return, would agree not to veto a UN Security Council resolution calling on the North to comply with international nuclear inspections rather than withdraw from the NPT. Qian did not immediately accept the deal, but in fact China did not veto the resolution.
With the precedent of the carefully limited 1992 New York meeting of Arnold Kanter and Kim Yong Sun before them, American officials were moving toward a decision to undertake direct negotiations with the North without the participation of the South, which was a reversal of often-declared U.S. policy. The WashingtonPyongyang talks were "the South Koreans' idea ... they actually came to us and suggested it," according to Raymond Burkhardt, who was acting U.S. ambassador in Seoul at the time. Burkhardt added, however, that it was initially understood on both sides that the talks would be limited to nuclear issues, which were peculiarly the province of the United States as a nuclear power.
With Washington still unable to decide