The Two Koreas_ A Contemporary History - Don Oberdorfer [179]
Looking back on the crisis, Perry identified the defueling of the North Korean reactor as the turning point, when it appeared that dialogue and "preventive diplomacy" had failed and when U.S. strategy shifted to "coercive diplomacy" involving sanctions. In the view of American military planners, the unloaded fuel rods represented a tangible and physical threat that the DPRK could move ahead to manufacture nuclear weapons. If not stopped near the beginning, they believed, North Korea eventually could possess an entire arsenal of nuclear weapons, which it could use for threats and blackmail and even to sell to high bidders in the Middle East. That simply could not be permitted to happen. Thus, despite the serious risk of war, "we believed that it was even more dangerous to allow North Korea to proceed with a large-scale nuclear weapons program," according to the secretary of defense.
To prepare for the potential storm, the Pentagon moved full steam ahead on its plans for additional U.S. military deployments. Simultaneously, the State Department launched a new round of talks about the nature and timing of international sanctions in the capitals of major powers and at the United Nations.
THE DEEPENING CONFLICT
The devastating possibilities of the deepening conflict were alarming to many of those most familiar with North Korea. Even administration officials conceded that sanctions were unlikely to force Pyongyang to reverse course: the isolated country was relatively invulnerable to outside pressures, since it had so little international commerce and few important international connections of any sort. Moreover, its fierce pride and often-repeated threats suggested that it might actually fight rather than capitulate.
A gaping omission in all that had been said and done was the absence of direct communication between the U.S. administration and the one person whose decisions were law in Pyongyang. Early in 1993, Les Aspin, Clinton's original secretary of defense, had proposed bringing the nuclear issue to a head by sending a delegation to make a bold and direct appeal to Kim Il Sung, but this was turned down as too risky. Under Perry, Aspin's successor, the Pentagon continued to urge direct contacts with Kim, but high-level dialogue by then had been identified by the State Department as a principal reward for good behavior, not to be permitted until North Korea earned it with agreements and performance.
However, in late May 1994, when the defueling crisis worsened and the Pentagon presented its alarming war plan, Clinton, at the urging of Perry and Ambassador Laney, asked Senators Sam Nunn and Richard Lugar to fly to Pyongyang to see Kim Il Sung. North Korea turned down the hastily prepared visit at the last minute, apparently because of a conflict with the Great Leader's schedule.
In early June, as Clinton opted for sanctions, former president Jimmy Carter reentered the Korea saga to play another historic role. Having been defeated for reelection in 1980, the successful broker of the Camp David accords in the Middle East carved out for himself a mission of promoting peaceful resolution of conflicts through his Atlanta-based Carter Center. At 69 years of age, the vigorous former president had already played a postpresidential intermediary role in the Middle East, Ethiopia, the Sudan, Somalia, and the former Yugoslavia.
Carter had received invitations from Kim II Sung in 1991, 1992, and 1993 to visit Pyongyang, but each time he had been asked by the State Department not to go on grounds that his trip would complicate the Korean problem rather than help to resolve it. The ROK government, mindful of Carter's abortive efforts as president to withdraw U.S. troops, opposed Carter's return to