The Two Koreas_ A Contemporary History - Don Oberdorfer [190]
It will be years, perhaps many years, before it will be possible to know with certainty how close the Korean peninsula came to a devastating new outbreak of war in the spring of 1994. It is instructive that those in the U.S. and ROK governments who were closest to the decisions are among those who, in retrospect, rate the chances for hostilities to have been the highest. It is clear, however, that the United States responded to North Korea's nuclear challenge with a combination of force and diplomacy which, although often improvised and lacking coherence, was equal to the seriousness of the issue. While seeking a negotiated settlement, the United States demonstrated that it was prepared to sponsor UN sanctions and was ready to counter the North Korean threat of a violent response by adding powerfully to its military forces in the area. The American undertaking was backed by South Korea, whose diplomats urged a negotiated solution and whose military prepared for action even while its president and public wavered with the winds, and by China, whose deft and quiet diplomacy placed important limitations on Pyongyang's freedom of action. Japan, although uncertain how far it could go to back the application of international sanctions and American military operations in view of constitutional and political restrictions, was preparing to join the informal coalition.
Whether by blunder or design, North Korea discovered by early 1993 that its nuclear program, with its potential to destabilize Northeast Asia and affect the prospects for nuclear proliferation in other parts of the world, was its most valuable asset in transactions with the outside world, especially after the loss of its Soviet ally and the devaluing of its relations with China. Pyongyang played its card brilliantly, forcing one of the world's richest and most powerful nations to undertake direct negotiations and to make concessions to one of the world's least successful nations. The nuclear threat proved, up to a point, to be Pyongyang's great equalizer.
In the spring of 1994, however, the growing power of the forces arrayed against it strongly suggested that further escalation of tension would be dangerous and not necessarily to North Korea's advantage. By the time Carter arrived, Kim Il Sung was seeking a way to end the crisis without losing face or surrendering his bargaining card, and the former president provided the means. By cooperating with Carter, accepting a U.S.-designed nuclear freeze, and agreeing to a NorthSouth summit meeting, the Great Leader defused the explosive confrontation while leaving the future open for further negotiations, which he planned to direct in the months to come.
14
DEATH AND ACCORD
n the morning of July 6, 1994, less than three weeks after he said good-bye to Jimmy Carter, Kim Il Sung sat behind the desk in his office and instructed senior officials on the economic goals for the year ahead. From all outward signs, the 82-year-old Great Leader was in good form, wearing a light blue Western-style suit and wagging his finger vigorously at two dozen officials arrayed in rows before him.
"Agriculture first. Light industry first. Foreign trade first," declared Kim, repeating the priorities he had announced in his New Year's address after conceding that the economy was in trouble. In a rich, husky rumble, which had been the voice of command in North Korea for nearly half a century, he set forth specific targets for the year: 850,000 tons of fertilizer, 12 million tons of cement, completion of 100 ships, and special priorities for railways, and metal industries. In remarks that would take on important meaning later, Kim gave top priority to the urgent need for more electric power. Saying that the much-discussed light-water nuclear reactors would take too long to ease the shortage