The Two Koreas_ A Contemporary History - Don Oberdorfer [199]
How to structure the terms of what was emerging as a comprehensive deal consumed much of the bargaining. North Koreans feared they would be made to give up everything at the beginning and then the Americans would renege in the long run. Americans feared a sweeping agreement in principle that would not be fulfilled by the North Koreans. Gallucci observed that "there wasn't sufficient trust for one to take a very large step assuming the other would take the compensatory counter step. There had to be a series of smaller steps linked with constant checking on compliance." Thus, the core of the agreement was a detailed timetable of reciprocal actions, some of which were spelled out in confidential minutes that were not made public due to North Korean sensibilities.
The rapid progress toward a far-reaching accord in the first week, as well as continued progress when the negotiations resumed in September after a six-week recess, was surprising to many American officials. U.S. negotiators surmised that, especially after Kim 11 Sung's death, the new leadership was under pressure to produce a deal that would enhance Kim Jong Il's stature. Moreover, Gallucci believed that the tangible threat of UN sanctions in the spring and American willingness to face down North Korea with a major infusion of additional ships, planes, and troops, as worrisome as it had been to all parties, was a crucial reason for his success. He called the events of June "a very good combination of political-military activity" that drove Pyongyang back to the bargaining table with a strong desire to reach a settlement.
One of the thorniest issues was the IAEA's demand, which Washington and the UN Security Council had endorsed, for "special inspections" of the two suspected nuclear waste sites at Yongbyon, which North Korea claimed were military facilities exempt from inspection. This dispute had been the immediate cause of Pyongyang's startling announcement eighteen months earlier that it was withdrawing from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. In the meantime, private declarations of its chief negotiator, Kang Sok Ju, as well as public statements from Pyongyang, warned that North Korea would "never" submit to what it described as a violation of its national sovereignty. Gallucci, on the other hand, came with firm instructions that North Korean acceptance of the "special inspections" must be part of the final agreement. This was clearly a deal-breaker-until both sides began showing flexibility.
The State Department's senior North Korea watcher, Robert Carlin, who had spent more than twenty years listening for nuances in North Korean statements, noticed that beginning September 23, Kang had stopped saying "never" about the special inspections. Carlin thought the omission significant. The Pyongyang-watcher was even more certain that something was up when, on September 27, Pyongyang radio broadcast a puzzling press statement by "a spokesman for DPRK Ministry of the People's Armed Forces." In blustery language, the statement seemed to attack the ongoing Geneva talks being conducted by the Foreign Ministry, declaring that the army had never expected anything, did not recognize "talks accompanied by pressure," and could "never allow any attempt to open up military facilities through special inspections." CIA experts in Washington, whom I happened to meet that afternoon at a conference on Korea policy, interpreted the statement as presaging even fiercer North Korean opposition to special inspections and a deadlock in the negotiations. Carlin, however, was convinced that the opposite was true-that