The Two Koreas_ A Contemporary History - Don Oberdorfer [206]
Due to the opposition to the armistice by then-President Syngman Rhee, South Korea was not a signatory to the armistice; therefore, North Korea insisted that the South not be included in talks about its future. From the American standpoint, it was out of the question to negotiate a bilateral peace treaty or other "peace insuring system" on the divided peninsula without the South Koreans, as our delegation told our hosts in no uncertain terms. Despite this imposing roadblock, the discussion of more permanent arrangements at the heavily fortified DMZ seemed to me a positive development.
The official attitude toward the South was the most troubling aspect of our talks in Pyongyang. Despite the North's reluctant commitment, in the Agreed Framework, to return to North-South dialogue, DPRK officials adamantly refused to deal with the ROK government, insisting it had irrevocably insulted North Korea by its conduct at the death of Kim 11 Sung. The foreign minister and others insisted that the South must formally apologize, which was highly unlikely, before talks could restart.
How much of this was honest anger and how much a tactic to avoid North-South negotiations and bait the South while concentrating on Pyongyang's relationship with the United States was impossible to tell. It was clear enough, though, that the absence of movement toward accommodation or detente between North and South was a serious problem for the United States in moving between a former enemy and a close ally.
THE STRUGGLE OVER THE REACTORS
The most important unresolved problem in implementing the Agreed Framework was the source and description of the light-water reactors to be furnished in exchange for North Korea's existing nuclear facilities. While the United States had negotiated the deal and sent a letter from Clinton to Kim Jong Il officially promising to provide the reactors, Washington did not propose to furnish or pay for them. South Korea had volunteered to provide them, and from the first, Washington called on Seoul to manufacture them in its sophisticated factories and underwrite most of their $4-$5 billion cost, with Japan putting up much of the rest. North Korea was reluctant to accept this high-tech export from its enemies in the South, but Gallucci and others insisted there was no alternative.
Three rounds of U.S.-DPRK expert talks on the topic in Beijing and Berlin ended in deadlock. Pyongyang was determined to avoid an open acknowledgment that South Korea might be the source of the reactors, insisting that it was up to the United States to provide them under an American label-but also saying that where they actually came from was Washington's business. Seoul, on the other hand, was determined that North Korea accept its central role in providing the light-water reactors, and that this role should be openly acknowledged by referring to the "South Korean type" reactors to be furnished.
A face-saving intermediary was the international consortium envisaged in the Agreed Framework. It was established by the United States, South Korea, and Japan in March 1995 as the Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization (KEDO), with an American executive director, former diplomat Stephen Bosworth, giving overall direction to the project.
In the Agreed Framework the United States had pledged to make the "best efforts" to conclude a contract to supply the new reactors by April 21, 1995-six months after the signing of the accord. As that date approached with negotiations deadlocked on the origin and name of the new reactors, North Korea threatened to abandon the Agreed Framework, ending the freeze on its existing nuclear program by reloading its 5-megawatt reactor. The situation was made more complicated by Seoul's adamant demand that the North clearly acknowledge the origin of its new reactors, on grounds that this was necessary if the National Assembly was to furnish the billions of dollars required. At the Berlin talks in late March,