The Two Koreas_ A Contemporary History - Don Oberdorfer [210]
Within the next few days, two developments combined to turn enthusiasm into anger, laying the basis for an abrupt policy reversal. First, a DPRK local official, apparently without central authorization, required a South Korean rice ship to fly a North Korean flag as it entered port on June 27. Although the North promptly apologized, the ROK government demanded a more formal apology and suspended rice shipments until it was received. The incident infuriated the public in the South, as did a later incident in which a sailor on a South Korean rice ship was arrested for taking photographs of a North Korean port.
The other key event was a series of dramatic losses by Kim Young Sam's ruling party in the June 27 nationwide elections for local offices-the first such elections since the military coup of 1961. It was widely perceived that Kim had been manipulating the rice aid for political gain before the vote and that his strategy had backfired. A political consultant told officials of the ruling party that anger at the aid package and at North Korean ingratitude cost the ruling party a million votes. Although the ROK government redeemed its pledge by eventually providing the undelivered portion of the 150,000 tons, the election results led to a sharp reversal in Kim Young Sam's posture.
As was evident in the nuclear negotiations, Kim had long been ambivalent about the North. A prominent South Korean told me, "I had the feeling from early in his administration, based on several private talks, that [the president] felt it was his destiny to bring about the collapse of North Korea on his watch, and be the man who made history by reunification of the country. He seemed to feel that if he pressed them hard, they'd give way." U.S. Ambassador James Laney who dealt with him frequently said Kim was a man divided in his own mind: "His more rational side says the collapse of North Korea would be a disaster, and he tells us all the things he's doing or is willing to do to cooperate with North Korea. On the other hand, his emotional side wants North Korea to collapse on his watch, so he can be the first to preside over a united Korea."
Kim's estimate of the situation in the North was repeatedly in flux. In July 1995, according to a State Department official, Kim told President Clinton, "I think [the North Koreans] are going down the tubes, and we should seek a gradual change" north of the thirtyeighth parallel. Four months later, after the flood, Kim told Vice President Gore in a bilateral meeting in Osaka, Japan, "There's no possibility of a soft landing. There's going to be a crash."
In early January 1996, Kim spoke out publicly against providing additional food aid for the North, declaring in his New Year policy speech that "it is a crime and a betrayal of the Korean people for North Korea to hope to receive aid from the international community while pouring all its natural resources into maintaining its military power." A senior aide to Kim, whom I saw shortly after the policy speech, made little effort to disguise the essentially domestic political nature of the president's turnabout, predicting that he would continue his hard line at least until after the National Assembly elections scheduled for April.
In the meantime, not only was Kim Young Sam's government unresponsive to UN and humanitarian appeals for food; it also sought to dissuade others from providing aid. In a Honolulu meeting with the United States and Japan in late January, Seoul officials argued that North Korea's plight was not so serious, and that in any case Pyongyang should be pressured to resume the formal NorthSouth dialogue as a condition of obtaining more food. A week after the meetings ended, however, Washington announced a $2 million contribution to the UN's emergency appeal without conditions. It was intended as